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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—BREAKING DOWN THE SUPREME COURT’S 
SPENDING CLAUSE RULING IN NFIB V. SEBELIUS: A HUGE BLOW TO THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR A MERE BUMP IN THE ROAD? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
June 28, 2012—it was the moment everyone had been waiting for. It 
was the day that the world would finally know whether the Supreme Court 
of the United States upheld the highly controversial Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”).1 The ruling was a great victo-
ry for President Barack Obama and the rest of the Democratic Party—with 
one exception. The Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius2 (“NFIB v. Sebelius”) struck down one part of the over 
900-page Affordable Care Act: the Medicaid expansion provision.3 The pro-
vision required all states “to expand their Medicaid programs by 2014 to 
cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of 
the federal poverty line.”4 If a state chose to decline the expansion, it faced 
losing all of its pre-Affordable Care Act federal Medicaid funding in the 
future.5  
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution—otherwise known as the 
Spending Clause—gives Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide 
for the . . . general Welfare of the United States.”6 The Supreme Court 
“ha[s] long recognized that Congress may use this power to grant federal 
funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon the States’ ‘taking 
certain actions that Congress could not require them to take.’”7 Conditional 
grants are an extremely important use of Congress’s spending power. This 
power generally “allows Congress to adopt policies beyond its enumerated 
powers in such areas as education, law enforcement, community develop-
ment and social services.”8 Conditional spending enables Congress to enlist 
  
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 2019.  
 2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 3. See generally id. 
 4. Id. at 2601 (citation omitted).  
 5. Id. at 2604.  
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 7. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)).  
 8. Paul L. Posner, The Supreme Court and the Remaking of Federalism, GOVERNING 
(July 18, 2012), http://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-supreme-court-health
-care-ruling-coercion-states-federalism.html.  
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the states in the implementation of programs designed to achieve federal 
goals in these arenas. To illustrate, Congress currently distributes “more 
than 950 federal grants [to the states in exchange for their agreements to 
adopt] . . . federal mandates, rules[,] and regulations.”9 By accepting so 
many federal grants, the states have developed somewhat of an addiction to 
federal money.10 As with most addictions, problems can arise for all parties 
involved, which was the case with the Medicaid expansion in NFIB v. 
Sebelius.  
In the decades leading up to the Affordable Care Act, the states had be-
come more dependent on federal Medicaid grants than any other federal 
money.11 Thus, while many of the states did not want to expand their Medi-
caid programs as contemplated by the Affordable Care Act, they felt com-
pelled to do so because they knew that they could not afford to lose all fu-
ture federal Medicaid funding.12 Accordingly, many of these states chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion condition and took 
their case all the way to the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius.13  
Although Congress generally has the power under the spending clause 
to incentivize the states to accept its conditional grants, it may not coerce 
them into doing so.14 As long as Congress merely encourages or induces the 
states to enact its federal programs, Congress’s condition will not run afoul 
of the Constitution.15 In NFIB v. Sebelius, the states argued that Congress 
was using coercion, rather than encouragement, to force them to adopt the 
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provision.16 The Court agreed 
with the states and held, for the first time ever,17 that the terms of a condi-
tional spending program crossed the constitutional line from encouragement 
to coercion.18  
The Court arrived at this conclusion by adopting a new understanding 
of what constitutes coercion: “When . . . conditions take the form of threats 
to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly 
  
 9. Id.  
 10. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause 
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 903 (2013) (using the word “addiction” to explain why one 
might question whether the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was coercive to the states). 
 11. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 13. Id.  
 14. See id. at 2602. 
 15. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).  
 16. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 17. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.). 
 18. Id. at 2603 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.), 2662 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”19 The 
two key elements of this coercion test are “significance” and “independ-
ence.”20 Because the original Medicaid funds were so significant in size, and 
because Congress used those funds to leverage the states acceptance of an 
independent Medicaid program, Congress engaged in coercion.21 While 
Congress is still free to “offer[] funds under the Affordable Care Act . . . and 
requir[e] that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on 
their use[,] . . . Congress is not free to . . . penalize States that choose not to 
participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid 
funding.”22   
Since NFIB v. Sebelius, many commentators have wondered what im-
plications the Medicaid ruling will have on Congress’s ability to use its 
spending power to create new programs and alter existing programs for the 
states.23 Despite the difficulty in determining exactly what impacts NFIB v. 
Sebelius will have, the likely outcome is that the vast majority of Congress’s 
conditions on federal grant programs will be upheld as constitutional. This 
note attempts to demonstrate why this is the case by applying the two coer-
cion elements of NFIB v. Sebelius—significance and independence—to 
three federal laws that could be at issue after the ruling: the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB),24 the Clean Air Act (CAA),25 and “Megan’s Law.”26 
This note will proceed as follows. Part II discusses the holding of NFIB 
v. Sebelius, the plurality and joint dissent’s reasoning underlying that hold-
ing, and the opinion that lower courts are likely to follow. Next, Part III ap-
plies the plurality’s coercion test to NCLB, the CAA, and “Megan’s Law.” 
Finally, Part IV concludes that, while NFIB v. Sebelius at least gives the 
states a plausible basis to challenge conditional spending programs, their 
chance of successfully invalidating the programs on constitutional grounds 
remains slim.  
  
 19. Id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).  
 20. See id. at 2604–06. 
 21. See id.  
 22. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 23. See generally, e.g., Carrie Johnson, How the Health Care Ruling Might Affect Civil 
Rights, NPR.ORG (July 6, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/06/156378347/how-
the-health-care-ruling-might-affect-civil-rights; Laura Ofobike, Making Waves Beyond 
Health Care, OHIO.COM (July 23, 2012, 10:29 PM), http://www.ohio.com/editorial/making-
waves-beyond-health-care-1.322169; Jordan Weissmann, The Most Important Part of To-
day’s Health Care Ruling You Haven’t Heard About, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2012, 3:33 
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/06/the-most-important-part-of-
todays-health-care-ruling-you-havent-heard-about/259134/.  
 24. No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 25. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 26. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796.  
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II. NFIB V. SEBELIUS: THE OPINION 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,27 seven out 
of the nine Supreme Court Justices found the Medicaid expansion coercive, 
and, thus, an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending power.28 Those 
seven Justices, however, split into two separate groups—the plurality and 
the joint dissenters.29 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion and 
was joined by Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan.30 The four remaining Jus-
tices that found the Medicaid expansion coercive—Justices Scalia, Kenne-
dy, Thomas, and Alito—signed on to the joint dissent.31 While those four 
Justices would have held the expansion provision unconstitutional based on 
the plurality’s analysis, they actually took the coercion analysis a step fur-
ther.32 As such, NFIB v. Sebelius contains two different tests for establishing 
unconstitutional coercion.33 Critically, however, the last part of this section 
will demonstrate why lower courts are more likely to follow the plurality 
opinion than the joint dissent.34 Nevertheless, it is necessary to discuss both 
the plurality opinion and the joint dissent because they each highlight spend-
ing clause principles and limits that will be informative for future analysis. 
A. The Plurality Opinion  
In a novel opinion, Chief Justice Roberts created a new standard for as-
sessing whether Congress has improperly coerced the states via conditional 
spending: “When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to 
terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly 
viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”35 This 
framework contains a two-part test. The Court must determine (1) whether 
the existing federal grant that Congress is threatening to terminate in the 
future is significant, and (2) whether that grant is independent from Con-
gress’s new condition that the states must adopt in order to keep receiving 
the original grant.36 The first element focuses on the amount of money at 
  
 27. 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 28. Id. at 2607 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan JJ.), 2666–
68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
 29. See sources cited supra note 28.  
 30. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2576–77 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 31. Id. at 2642, 2656–57 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
 32. See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 33. See generally infra Parts II.A–C.  
 34. See infra Part II.C.  
 35. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.) (emphasis added).  
 36. See id. at 2604–06.  
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stake and the degree of reliance the states have on that money.37 The larger 
the amount of money and the higher the degree of reliance, the more likely 
Congress’s new condition is to be coercive on the states.38 The second ele-
ment requires a court to decide whether Congress’s new condition is its own 
independent program, and whether Congress is using the threatened pro-
gram as leverage to force states into accepting the new condition.39 The 
more the new condition looks like an independent program, the more likely 
Congress is using its spending power to coerce the states into accepting the 
condition.40 
Applying this two-part test, the plurality found Congress’s Medicaid 
expansion coercive, and thus, held that Congress exceeded its power under 
the Constitution.41 In order to fully understand the test and its application, it 
is first necessary to demonstrate how the plurality arrived at this test and 
what prompts a coercion analysis.   
1. Prompting a Coercion Analysis 
Under the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the 
power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the 
United States.”42 The Supreme Court has held that Congress’s power to pro-
vide for the general welfare necessarily includes its power to spend for the 
general welfare.43 Congress’s power to spend for the “general welfare” has 
consistently been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be a very broad pow-
er.44 Critically, it is not confined to only the enumerated powers laid out in 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.45 Rather, Congress, through the 
spending power alone, has been able to implement numerous spending pro-
grams such as, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and even the Afforda-
ble Care Act. Congress’s rationale behind instituting programs like these is 
  
 37. See id. at 2604–05. 
 38. See id.  
 39. Id. at 2605–06. These two elements combined have often been referred to as the 
“anti-leveraging principle.” See e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 866. 
 40. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by 
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).  
 41. Id. at 2606–07.  
 42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 43. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2657–58 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).  
 44. Id. at 2658 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)). Justice Scalia, 
writing for the joint dissent, explained that “‘[t]he discretion belongs to Congress,’” and 
“‘unless the choice is clearly wrong,’” Congress’s expenditure will qualify as spending for 
the “‘general welfare.’” Id. (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640).  
 45. See id. (citing Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548, 586–87 (1937)). 
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that they are good for the “general welfare” of the nation, and Congress usu-
ally has some specific purpose it would like to achieve as a result. 
Spending Clause legislation has also consistently been regarded “as 
‘much in the nature of a contract.’”46 Thus, when Congress, through its 
spending power, contracts with the states to implement one of its spending 
programs, Congress must adhere to the usual rules of contract, such as offer, 
acceptance, and consideration.47 One limitation on Congress’s spending 
power, and in contract law, is coercion.48 If Congress intends to offer federal 
money in exchange for state compliance with new conditions, the states 
must “voluntarily and knowingly accept[] the terms of the ‘contract.’”49 To 
ensure that state acceptance is voluntary and knowing, rather than coerced, 
Congress must provide the states with a “legitimate choice whether to accept 
the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds.”50 In order for the 
states’ choice to be legitimate, that choice must be real, not merely theoreti-
cal.51 Otherwise, coercion will result.52 
Many of the spending programs that Congress contracts with the states 
to implement are heavily funded by federal money.53 Many of these pro-
grams are also implemented mainly by the states.54 Regardless of the signifi-
cant role the states play in implementing these federal programs, the Su-
preme Court has consistently held that Congress may not compel the states 
to enact such legislation.55 States are their own separate and independent 
sovereigns, and they must be able to govern that way without undue inter-
ference from the federal government.56  
However, neither the state sovereignty principle nor Congress’s coer-
cion limitation necessarily means that Congress is prohibited from using its 
  
 46. Id. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (quot-
ing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).  
 47. See id. at 2602–03; see also, e.g., Zemke v. City of Chi., 100 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“The elements of a contract, taught like the ABC’s to first-year law students, are offer, 
acceptance, and consideration.”).  
 48. See id. at 2602. 
 49. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).  
 50. Id. at 2602–03.  
 51. See id.  
 52. See id. 
 53. See Chris Edwards, Fiscal Federalism, DOWNSIZING THE FED. GOV’T 1 (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/fiscal-
federalism.pdf. The Downsizing the Federal Government website is a project of the CATO 
Institute. See generally DOWNSIZING THE FED. GOV’T, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2013).  
 54. See Edwards, supra note 53, at 1.  
 55. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992)).  
 56. Id.  
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spending power to encourage or induce states to implement and oversee any 
federal programs that it thinks are beneficial to the general welfare of the 
nation. The Supreme Court has “long recognized that Congress may . . . 
grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such . . . grant[s] upon 
the States’ ‘taking certain actions that Congress could not [directly] require 
them to take.’”57 One of the most common ways Congress induces the states 
to implement and oversee programs like Medicaid, for example, is by offer-
ing them federal money in exchange for compliance with the terms of the 
federal program it wants carried out.58 For example, suppose Congress 
writes a bill that says to the states, “[H]ere is some money, but [you can only 
have it if you implement these policies] we think [are important].”59 Based 
on those facts alone, this would be a clear case of mere constitutional in-
ducement or encouragement because the states could simply decline the 
offer without losing anything.60 However, Congress can create an issue 
when, in exchange for new conditions to a federal program, Congress not 
only offers states additional money but also threatens to stop providing the 
funding it currently distributes for that program. A condition like this would 
prompt further coercion analysis to test its constitutionality because that 
condition could possibly violate the basic principle that the “Federal Gov-
ernment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulato-
ry program.”61 This was one of the primary issues that the Supreme Court 
faced in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.62 
In NFIB v. Sebelius, Congress included a Medicaid expansion provi-
sion in the newly enacted Affordable Care Act.63 This provision required 
states to dramatically increase their Medicaid obligations by expanding the 
number of needy individuals the original program covered.64 However, 
Congress did more than say to the states, “If you expand your Medicaid 
programs to cover these new groups, then you can have all of this extra fed-
eral money.” Congress also said that, if the states refuse to cover the new 
groups, then “not only will we not give you any additional Medicaid money, 
  
 57. Id. at 2601 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)). 
 58. Edwards, supra note 53, at 1. 
 59. Erin Ryan, Spending Power Bargaining After Sebelius, OUPBLOG (July 3, 2012, 
10:30 AM), http://blog.oup.com/2012/07/spending-power-bargaining-after-obamacare/ (es-
say commenting on the spending power implications of the plurality’s opinion).  
 60. The joint dissent might disagree with this conclusion. Depending on the size of the 
federal grant being offered, this example could constitute coercion under the joint dissent’s 
analysis. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 61. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)). 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
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we will take away all of your original Medicaid funds in the future.”65 The 
states argued that this was no longer mere encouragement or inducement but 
was actual coercion such that they essentially had no choice but to accept 
the Medicaid expansion in order to continue their original Medicaid pro-
grams.66 Although the plurality emphasized that conditions that threaten 
other funds are not always coercive, it believed that the states had a point in 
their argument and that a situation like this prompted a coercion analysis.67  
To begin its discussion in NFIB v. Sebelius, the plurality first reiterated 
the contract and Spending Clause principles68 discussed above.69 Then, the 
plurality presented a new way for Congress’s offer to not be legitimate, and, 
thus, for coercion to result: “When, for example, [Congress’s new] condi-
tions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent 
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the 
States to accept policy changes.”70 This version of coercion contains a two-
part test: (1) whether the federal grant being threatened is significant, and 
(2) whether the new condition is independent from the current federal pro-
gram.71  
2.  Significance: The Amount of Money at Stake and the Amount of      
Reliance Involved 
The significance element of the two-part coercion test requires inquiry 
into the size of the threatened federal grant and the degree of reliance the 
states have on that grant.72 To explain what this means, the plurality re-
viewed the holding in the seminal case, South Dakota v. Dole.73 In Dole, 
Congress passed a law that threatened to withhold five percent of state fed-
  
 65. See id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). See also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 869. As Professor Bagenstos explained, the 
Chief Justice “made clear that the determination that Congress has threatened to ‘terminate 
significant independent grants’ is the trigger for conducting a coercion analysis, not the con-
clusion of that analysis.” Id.  
 68. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.).  
 69. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.  
 70. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). This is not the only way Congress can engage in coercion. The words “for exam-
ple” in the quote signify that there are other ways in which Congress could engage in coer-
cion. However, the plurality did not elaborate on what those other ways could be. Rather, it 
was enough for the plurality to conclude that Congress’s use of the Medicaid expansion met 
at least one method of coercion, and, thus, was unconstitutional. See id. 
 71. See id. at 2604–06. 
 72. See id. at 2604. 
 73. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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eral highway funding if the states did not raise their drinking age to twenty-
one.74 This was a type of situation that prompted a further coercion analysis 
because not only did Congress decline to offer additional money under the 
law, it threatened the states’ future federal funds under the current highway 
program.75 The Court made clear in Dole that for this type of financial in-
ducement to be constitutional, it must give states a real choice, “not merely 
in theory but in fact.”76 The Court found that the states had a legitimate 
choice in whether to accept or reject the drinking age requirement because 
Congress threatened only five percent of state highway funding.77 Because 
Congress was only threatening to revoke a small amount of federal funding 
paid to the states, this threat was merely “mild encouragement” to raise the 
drinking age.78 In other words, while Congress clearly wanted the states to 
raise their drinking age and not relinquish any federal money, this was not 
coercion because, at the end of the day, the ultimate choice was still up to 
the states.79 What mattered to the Court was the size of the federal grant at 
stake.80 It found that five percent was simply not a significant enough 
amount of money to amount to coercion.81 In fact, if South Dakota chose to 
not raise its drinking age and lose five percent of its federal highway funds, 
it only stood to lose less than one half of one percent of its state budget at 
that time.82 Thus, the choice of “[w]hether to accept the drinking age change 
‘remain[ed] the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact.’”83 
Although Congress provided the states with a real choice in Dole, it did 
not provide that same choice in NFIB v. Sebelius.84 In fact, the plurality went 
so far as to call the Medicaid expansion provision “a gun to the head.”85 This 
analogy helped further explain what was meant all along by choice in theory 
versus choice in fact. In reality, you almost always have the free will to 
make a choice—even in a situation where you are robbed at gunpoint.86 In 
  
 74. Id. at 205. 
 75. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 76. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12).  
 77. Id. at 2604 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).  
 78. Id. (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 211). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.) (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628, 630, (8th Cir. 1986), aff’d, 483 U.S. 
203 (1987)). 
 83. Id. (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12).  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 2605 n.12 (“‘Your money or your life’ is a coercive proposition whether 
you have a single dollar in your pocket or $500.”). See also Richard Epstein, Derailing the 
Medicaid Expansion: Chief Justice Roberts Gets This One Right, ADVANCING A FREE SOC’Y 
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that situation, you could chose to either give up your money and save your 
life, or you could tell the robber no and potentially lose both your life and 
your money; however, at least in theory, the choice is still yours. Despite the 
fact that there is a choice in theory, the plurality still concluded that “‘your 
money or your life’” is in fact “a coercive proposition, whether you have a 
single dollar in your pocket or $500.”87 With either option, the chooser re-
mains in a lose/lose situation, which raises the question: while you may have 
a choice in theory, is it really one in fact? 
Like Dole, NFIB v. Sebelius answered this “real choice” question by 
inquiring into the size of the federal grant at stake.88 Unlike in Dole, where 
South Dakota stood to lose only less than half of one percent of its state 
budget, any state that chose to opt out of the Medicaid expansion stood to 
lose all of its future federal Medicaid funding, which accounted for over 
twenty percent of the average state’s total budget.89 Moreover, the federal 
government contributed a significant amount of money to each state’s Med-
icaid program.90 One report revealed that federal funds covered fifty to 
eighty-three percent of the average state’s entire Medicaid budget.91 With 
this much of the states’ Medicaid programs being funded by the federal 
government, if Congress took all of the funding away, what would even be 
left of Medicaid? The fact that the states stood to lose such a large amount 
of money from their overall budgets and Medicaid programs did not sit well 
with the plurality. To the plurality, Congress’s threat to terminate all of the 
states’ Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the expansion amounted to 
“economic dragooning,” such that the states essentially had no real choice in 
fact.92 
  
(June 28, 2012, 10:22 PM), http://www.advancingafreesociety.org/exclusive/topics/health-
care/derailing-the-medicaid-expansion-chief-justice-roberts-gets-this-one-right/; Mario Loyo-
la, The Supreme Court’s Ruling on Medicaid, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 29, 2012, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/304474/supreme-courts-ruling-medicaid-mario-
loyola. Although both Mr. Loyola and Professor Epstein believe that the coercion line was 
once again drawn in the wrong place, they still found that the plurality ultimately made the 
right decision. Professor Epstein explained that there is a more sensible way to draw the line 
between inducement and coercion: “[I]f I promise you something that I own to get you to do 
what I would like, it is an inducement. If I threaten to take away something that you own, it is 
a threat.” Epstein, supra. According to Professor Epstein, it is the “initial allocation of prop-
erty rights [that] matters[,]” and “it makes no sense to say that the robber who wants only 5 
percent of your money for car fare has not coerced you.” Id. 
 87. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 n.12 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.).  
 88. See id. at 2604. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 2604–05. 
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Additionally, implicit in the discussion of the significance element was 
the concept of reliance. For years now, the states had heavily relied on this 
large federal grant to fund their Medicaid programs.93 Through the use of 
their federal money, “the States have developed intricate statutory and ad-
ministrative regimes over the course of many decades to implement their 
objectives under existing Medicaid.”94 Thus, if a state chose to opt out of the 
expansion and lose all federal funds, efforts to structure a well-functioning 
Medicaid program would be futile.95 
The states’ heavy reliance coupled with their potential loss of signifi-
cant federal funding assisted the plurality in concluding that Congress gave 
the states no real choice in fact.96 Like the gun to the head analogy, the states 
could, against their will, expand their Medicaid programs as the Affordable 
Care Act provided or they could decline to do so and face losing what would 
essentially be their lives—a substantial amount of money that they relied on 
for years. They had a choice—at least in theory; however, either of these 
options leaves the chooser with no real choice in fact, and Congress cannot 
use its spending power to coerce the states into making such a choice.97  
The plurality wanted to make clear, however, that it was not taking the 
role of the states’ protective mother. It explained that the Court will always 
“look to the States to defend their prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple ex-
pedient of not yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to 
embrace the federal policies as their own.”98 In other words, the states are 
not children; they are adults and should be able to tell Congress no if they do 
not want to adopt a certain policy—large amount of money or not. After all, 
“States are separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act 
like it.”99 But here, there was more going on than the states just running to 
the Court for help because they could not possibly resist Congress’s dan-
gling carrot.100 This particular federal grant was so significant not only be-
cause of its size, but because the states had heavily relied on it.101 To take 
  
 93. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.); see also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 870 (“But as the Chief Justice’s reference 
to the ‘loss’ of funds suggests, the amount of money at stake was not important in and of 
itself; it was important because states had come to rely upon federal Medicaid funds to pro-
vide a major portion of their revenues.”).  
 94. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. at 2604–05. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 2603 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)). 
 99. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 2604.  
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that grant away from the states now, if they did not accept Congress’s terms, 
would be near Armageddon for most state budgets. To the states, that was 
no real choice—it was literally their money or their life. Thus, while the 
threat of withholding all of a state’s funding in a heavily entrenched federal 
program will not always amount to coercion in and of itself, when coupled 
with significant reliance, Congress’s condition is more likely coercive.102  
The significance of the threatened program is only one element of the 
new coercion test adopted by the plurality. The second element concerns the 
“independence” of that program from the new conditions being offered.103  
3.  Independence: Additional Condition or Completely Different  
Program? 
In determining whether the Medicaid expansion was coercive, the plu-
rality ruled it was necessary to analyze whether the expansion was an inde-
pendent program apart from the original Medicaid program.104 This inde-
pendence element is met when Congress creates a new condition that is in-
dependent and distinct from the original program Congress is purporting to 
modify, and Congress uses that program’s grant as leverage to force the 
states to accept the new condition.105  
To better understand independence, it is first necessary to explain what 
is commonly referred to as the “germaneness test.”106 This test is not an el-
ement of coercion.107 Rather, it is a wholly separate limitation on Congress’s 
spending power.108 Under the germaneness test, any condition that Congress 
places on a federal grant must be reasonably related to the purpose of that 
expenditure.109 In Dole, for example, Congress’s condition met the ger-
maneness test because the drinking age was “directly related to . . . safe in-
terstate travel.”110 This additional limitation on Congress’s spending power 
should not be confused with whether a condition is independent enough to 
constitute coercion. A condition may be germane or related to the purpose of 
a federal grant and simultaneously be independent of that grant as well, 
which was the case in NFIB v. Sebelius.111 In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Medicaid 
  
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 2605–06. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by 
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 106. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987). 
 107. Id. at 207. 
 108. Id. at 208 n.3. 
 109. See id.  
 110. Id. at 208. 
 111. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132. S. Ct. 2566, 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) 
(plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); see also Bagenstos supra note 10, at 918. 
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expansion was germane to the purpose of the original Medicaid program—
healthcare coverage for the nation’s poor.112  
At the same time, however, the plurality concluded that, in reality, the 
title of “expansion” was a mere label, and Congress created an entirely new 
program independent of the original Medicaid program.113 The original 
Medicaid program required states to provide medical assistance to “needy 
persons.”114 Specifically, the program targeted “four particular categories of 
the needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with de-
pendent children.”115 Through the expansion, Congress sought to expand 
these categories of needy people to include “all individuals under the age of 
65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.”116 The gov-
ernment argued that Congress reserved its right to make this change because 
the original Medicaid agreement with the states provided that Congress 
would have the power to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program as it 
developed.117 According to the government, “alter” or “amend” is exactly 
what Congress did.118  
Justice Ginsburg, one of the two dissenting Justices on the spending 
clause issue, agreed with the government’s position.119 She explained that 
the Medicaid expansion was not an independent program but was simply a 
mere alteration of the original Medicaid agreement.120 Thus, although Con-
gress originally determined that only four particular categories of individu-
als qualified as “needy persons” eligible for Medicaid, now Congress 
  
Chief Justice Roberts did not expressly state that the expansion was germane to the purpose 
of Medicaid. However, he implied that the expansion met the germaneness test when he 
analogized it to the facts of Dole. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality 
opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). Despite the Chief Justice’s lack of mention, Justice 
Ginsburg confirmed that the expansion was germane to Medicaid in the dissent. Id. at 2634–
35 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in 
part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.). 
 112. See NFIB, 132. S. Ct. at 2634–35 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.) (“The ACA, in contrast, 
relates solely to the federally funded Medicaid program . . . [F]ederal funds will be spent on 
health care for the poor in furtherance of Congress’ present perception of the general wel-
fare.”). 
 113. Id. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 114. Id. at 2605. 
 115. Id. at 2605–06.  
 116. Id. at 2601.  
 117. See id. at 2605. 
 118. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 119. See id. at 2635–36 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.). 
 120. See id. at 2636–39. Justice Ginsburg argued that the states expressly agreed that 
Congress was allowed to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program, and, furthermore, the 
states are accustomed to Congress changing programs in this way. See id. 
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deemed “needy persons” should include those four groups and nonelderly 
people with incomes below 133% of the poverty level.121 
Despite the dissent’s argument, the plurality found the Medicaid ex-
pansion met the independence element.122 Congress created a new condition, 
the Medicaid expansion, which was independent and distinct from the origi-
nal Medicaid program; Congress used the original Medicaid grant as lever-
age to force the states to accept the expansion.123 Rather than simply expand-
ing the boundaries of the four original categories, the expansion turned 
Medicaid into “an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide uni-
versal health insurance coverage.”124 To illustrate, the plurality referred to 
the manner in which Congress structured the expansion. In Dole, for exam-
ple, the drinking age condition was independent of the highway program 
because it “was not a restriction on how [South Dakota’s] highway funds . . . 
were to be used.”125 Similarly, the Medicaid expansion did not restrict how 
the states were allowed to use their original Medicaid funding. In fact, Con-
gress provided that the new recipients under the expansion would not even 
  
 121. Id. The Chief Justice explained that he was not prepared to conclude that the Medi-
caid expansion was a real expansion simply because Congress deemed it so. Id. at 2605 
(Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). However, Justice Gins-
burg noted that “Courts owe a large measure of respect to Congress’ characterization of the 
grant programs it establishes[,]” and “Congress has broad authority to construct or adjust 
spending programs to meet its contemporary understanding of “the general Welfare.” Id. at 
2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in 
part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.). After analyzing both the Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg’s 
arguments, it appears that the independence element may be even more difficult to determine 
than the significance element. It seems this decision came down to hair splitting. On the one 
hand, the Medicaid expansion was simply a further expansion of what Congress considered 
“needy persons,” and, thus, Congress simply did what it has always been allowed to do—
amend the law to include that new group. On the other hand, the expansion also looks like 
such a significant transformation of the original Medicaid program that it becomes a different 
healthcare program. The Chief Justice emphasized this point in the plurality opinion: “It is no 
longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive 
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.” Id. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) 
(plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). In the end, however, it was the Chief 
Justice’s conclusion that carried the day.  
 122. See id. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).  
 123. Id.  
 124. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.).  
 125. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 918. The Court in Dole did not expressly conclude that 
the drinking age condition was independent of South Dakota’s highway funding. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts made this point about the facts of Dole for the first time in NFIB v. Sebelius. 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan). The 
likely reason behind the Court’s lack of independence discussion in Dole is that the threat-
ened highway funds were so obviously insignificant that it would be unnecessary to elaborate 
on the coercion requirement any further.  
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be funded with money from the original program.126 Rather, “Congress cre-
ated a separate funding provision to cover the costs” of the newly eligible 
recipients.127 In addition to separate funds, the Medicaid expansion was in-
dependent of the original Medicaid program because “[t]he conditions on 
use of the different funds [were] also distinct.”128 For example, persons that 
were newly eligible under the expansion would receive less comprehensive 
coverage than persons under the current Medicaid program.129 According to 
the plurality, this was much more than a mere shift in degree—it was “a 
shift in kind”130—and when Congress creates an independent program like 
this, it may not coerce acceptance by using the states’ participation in a sep-
arate program as leverage.131  
Moreover, it was irrelevant that the original Medicaid agreement said 
Congress could “alter” or “amend” the program, because it was a complete-
ly different program.132 Allowing Congress to revoke all of a state’s original 
  
 126. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2605.  
 131. Id. at 2607. 
 132. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality, took issue with the government’s 
argument that the states were put on notice with the language “alter” or “amend.” One of the 
limitations on Congress’s spending power is that all “conditions must be unambiguous so that 
a State at least knows what it is getting into” when it accepts federal conditions and money. 
Id. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). Although Congress’s “‘spending power is 
broad, it does not include surprising participating States with post-acceptance or “retroactive” 
conditions.’” Id. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer and Kagan, JJ.) 
(quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25.). According to the plurality, “[a] State could [have] hard-
ly anticipate[d] that . . . ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ . . . included the power to transform [the Medicaid 
program] so dramatically.” Id. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, took issue with this 
conclusion. While she agreed that “Congress must provide clear notice of conditions it might 
later impose[,]” the plurality had gone too far with its understanding of notice. Id. at 2637 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) 
(joined by Sotomayor, J.). Under the plurality’s understanding of notice, at the law’s incep-
tion in 1965, Congress should have warned the states of any and every possible future change 
it would make to Medicaid. Id. Not only is this impossible, but, as Justice Ginsburg ex-
plained, past “decisions do not support such a requirement.” Id. While some might feel 
strongly, one way or the other, about which opinion was correct in this instance, the notice 
requirement may be irrelevant. It is hard to imagine that the plurality would have reversed its 
conclusion on the independence element of coercion if Congress had simply written in the 
original Medicaid agreement, “We have the right to engage in coercion in the future.” The 
plurality held that Congress may not use a current spending program as leverage to force 
states to accept some other separate and independent program. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
plurality would have accepted an agreement between Congress and the states that allowed 
Congress to use this type of leveraging technique. With or without notice, the Medicaid ex-
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Medicaid funds if it did not implement a new and independent Medicaid 
program, would be allowing Congress to engage in coercion—period.133 
Thus, based on the significant size of the original Medicaid program and 
Congress’s use of leveraging to force the states to implement a completely 
independent healthcare program, it was not hard for the plurality to conclude 
that Congress was engaging in coercion, and, therefore, exceeded its power 
under the spending clause.134 
B. The Joint Dissent 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito were the remaining four 
Justices that voted in favor of holding that the Medicaid expansion exceeded 
Congress’s spending power under the constitution.135 While the plurality 
found the expansion coercive based on the independence of the expansion 
and the significant size of the Medicaid grant, the joint dissenters primarily 
focused on the latter, and, in turn, created a much broader coercion analy-
sis.136 The joint dissenters expanded both ways Congress’s conditions could 
prompt a coercion analysis and the scope of what constitutes coercion.137 
Before doing this, however, there were three important limitations on Con-
gress’s spending power that were first necessary to address.138  
1. The Joint Dissent’s Setup for its Coercion Analysis 
The joint dissenters began their discussion of the structural limitations 
on Congress’s spending clause power by explaining three important re-
quirements for Congress’s use of conditions: (1) the “conditions must be 
unambiguous so that a State at least knows what it is getting into”; (2) the 
“[c]onditions must . . . be related ‘to the federal interest in particular nation-
al projects or programs’”; and (3) “while Congress may seek to induce 
States to accept conditional grants, Congress may not cross the ‘point at 
which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement.’”139 Of 
  
pansion would still be coercive, and Congress cannot get away with violating the Constitu-
tion—even if it gives the proper advance notice that it plans to do so. My thanks to Professor 
Joshua Silverstein of UALR William H. Bowen School of Law for helping me develop this 
argument. Interview with Joshua M. Silverstein, Professor of Law, UALR William H. Bowen 
School of Law, in Little Rock, Ark. (Jan. 25, 2013). 
 133. Id. 2606–07 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 134. See id. at 2604–07. 
 135. Id. at 2666–68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 136. See infra Part II.B.2.  
 137. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 138. See infra Part II.B.1.  
 139. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).  
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these three limitations, only the third raised a serious concern.140 Like the 
plurality, the joint dissent focused on the third requirement because it ad-
dressed the central question of whether Congress engaged in coercion with 
its use of the Medicaid expansion.141 Thus, the joint dissent’s discussion of 
the first two requirements was brief. 
The second requirement describes what this note previously referred to 
as the “the germaneness test.”142 This test requires that federal conditions be 
related to a particular purpose of their federal expenditure.143 The joint dis-
sent only briefly mentions the germaneness test.144 Perhaps the reasoning 
behind this requirement’s lack of discussion in both the plurality and joint 
dissent’s opinions was that it was so obviously met. It would be hard to dis-
pute that the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion was not related to 
one of the main purposes for which Medicaid funds are expended—
healthcare coverage for America’s poor. Thus, while it may be necessary to 
address this point when considering how a post-NFIB v. Sebelius legal land-
scape applies to other federal spending programs, it is understandable why 
neither the plurality nor the joint dissent thought it was necessary to discuss 
germaneness any further than a mere mention. 
The first requirement, unambiguous conditions, was also not discussed 
much further than a mere mention. Unlike the plurality, which used this 
requirement to lead into a discussion of the third requirement’s (coercion) 
independence element,145 the joint dissent did not inquire into it at all. As 
established earlier, the only requirement that the plurality and joint dissent 
thought was relevant was the third requirement, coercion.146 
Although the plurality and joint dissent agreed that coercion was the 
only important requirement to fully address, the opinions differed in their 
analysis of that requirement. In particular, the joint dissent’s coercion analy-
sis differed both qualitatively and quantitatively from the plurality in many 
ways.147 It broadened not only the ways Congress’s conditions could prompt 
a coercion analysis, but also the scope of what constitutes coercion.148  
  
 140. See id. at 2660.  
 141. See id. 
 142. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 143. E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987).  
 144. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 145. See id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).  
 146. See id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 147. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 148. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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2. The Joint Dissent’s Significantly Broader Coercion Analysis  
The joint dissent’s coercion analysis differed from the plurality’s in 
many ways. To illustrate their differences, the joint dissent offered the fol-
lowing hypothetical: 
Suppose, for example, that Congress enacted legislation offering each 
State a grant equal to the State’s entire annual expenditures for primary 
and secondary education. Suppose also that this funding came with con-
ditions governing such things as school curriculum, the hiring and tenure 
of teachers, the drawing of school districts, the length and hours of the 
school day, the school calendar, a dress code for students, and rules for 
student discipline. As a matter of law, a State could turn down that offer, 
but if it did so, its residents would not only be required to pay the federal 
taxes needed to support this expensive new program, but they would also 
be forced to pay an equivalent amount in state taxes. And if the State 
gave in to the federal law, the State and its subdivisions would surrender 
their traditional authority in the field of education.149  
The joint dissent concluded that a situation like the hypothetical would 
constitute coercion.150 This opinion demonstrates a much broader version of 
coercion than the plurality’s version. Prior to the creation of the Medicaid 
expansion, all of the states had previously accepted, and were currently exe-
cuting, the original Medicaid program.151 Furthermore, Congress’s condi-
tion, the Medicaid expansion, contained both an offer and a threat: if the 
states choose to accept the expansion, they would gain additional funding, 
but if the states choose to decline the expansion, they would lose future 
funding under the original Medicaid program.152 None of these characteris-
tics were present in the hypothetical. 
First, the joint dissent extended the manner in which Congress’s condi-
tions could prompt a coercion analysis. Through this hypothetical, the dis-
sent opened the door to the possibility that Congress’s first-time offer of a 
new program could prompt a coercion analysis.153 Notice that in this hypo-
thetical, Congress is offering the states a completely new education program 
for the first time.154 Additionally, a threat of withholding future funding is 
not required to prompt a coercion analysis under the joint dissent’s hypo-
  
 149. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
 150. Id. at 2661–62. 
 151. See Medicaid Enrollment by State, MEDICAID.GOV, http://medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-information/By-State/By-State.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).  
 152. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 153. See id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 154. See id. 
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thetical.155 In the hypothetical, Congress is only offering education funding 
to the states and not threatening to take anything away.156 Thus, under the 
joint dissent’s reasoning, Congress’s new condition could prompt a coercion 
analysis when it either threatens to revoke the states’ significant future fund-
ing or when it merely offers the states a large amount of additional fund-
ing.157 Once it is established that a fact pattern prompts a coercion analysis, 
an actual coercion test should be applied next. The joint dissent modified 
this too, and in two different ways.  
The first way that the joint dissent modified the plurality’s coercion test 
was by disregarding the plurality’s “independence” element and focusing 
entirely on what the plurality called “significance.”158 Thus, it seemed unim-
portant to the joint dissent whether Congress was leveraging a state’s partic-
ipation in one program to force it to participate in another program.159 Ra-
ther, the size—and only the size—of the federal grant was crucial.160 In other 
words, the joint dissent found only what the plurality termed “significance” 
to be relevant.161 
The second, and final, way that the joint dissent modified the plurali-
ty’s coercion test was by developing a broader understanding of the plurali-
ty’s notion of significance. The joint dissent’s hypothetical shows that, un-
like the plurality, it did not find the reliance factor important. In the hypo-
  
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 2662. I separate the joint dissent’s opinion in this manner in an attempt to 
clarify the differences between the joint dissenters and the plurality. A mere offer, in and of 
itself, will not prompt a coercion analysis. The offer would need to be coupled with a signifi-
cant amount of funds for a coercion analysis to be necessary. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 158. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissent-
ing). The joint dissent never specifically stated that it found the plurality’s “independence” 
element irrelevant. Rather, the joint dissent simply never mentioned the element in its coer-
cion analysis. Additionally, unlike the plurality, the joint dissent never flat-out referred to its 
coercion test as requiring a “significance” element. Nevertheless, the joint dissent’s explana-
tion of coercion is similar enough to the plurality’s significance element that it is proper to 
analogize the two. Compare id., with id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by 
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (both opinions discussing the coerciveness of a program in relation to 
the size of the federal grant at issue).  
 159. Although the joint dissent concluded that the Medicaid expansion was coercive 
without the plurality’s “independence” element, this does not necessarily mean that the joint 
dissent would entirely disregard this element in future coercion analyses. It is quite possible 
that the joint dissent would use this element in the future to find another federal program 
coercive. Perhaps if a situation like NFIB arose again, but this time the program was not as 
significant as Medicaid, then the joint dissent might refer to the plurality’s independence 
element for guidance. However, as I explain in Part II.C, while this might be the case for this 
element in the future, the joint dissent certainly does not require this element today.  
 160. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissent-
ing).  
 161. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 153.  
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thetical, Congress had never previously offered the program or money at 
issue.162 Rather, the hypothetical sets up a first time offer and acceptance 
situation between Congress and the states, and, therefore, reliance was not 
even an issue.163 What the joint dissent centered its significance analysis on 
instead were the possible tax consequences the states would bear if they 
declined Congress’s offer.164 Like the plurality, the joint dissent reiterated 
that Congress must give states a legitimate choice in whether to accept or 
decline a federal program, and that choice must be “not merely in theory but 
in fact.”165 In the hypothetical, at least in theory, the states could either de-
cline or accept Congress’s offer. If a state chose to decline the offer, that 
state’s citizens would still bear the burden of paying federal taxes to support 
the education program for the other states that chose to accept the pro-
gram.166 However, if that state is still required to pay the heavy tax price for 
declining the program anyway, then what choice does it really have?167 The 
other option would be to accept and implement a program it never wanted 
from the beginning.168 Again, is that a real choice? Allowing the federal 
government to engage in a situation like this would essentially put the states 
in a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation—i.e., coercion. Us-
ing the plurality’s terms, the joint dissent would call a similar hypothetical 
situation, “a gun to the head,” which exceeds Congress’s spending power in 
the Constitution.169  
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, however, “[a] State . . . has no claim 
on the money its residents pay in federal taxes.”170 While the joint dissent 
acknowledged that her point was “true as a formal matter[,]” as a practical 
matter, her point falls flat.171 According to the joint dissent, “unless Justice 
Ginsburg thinks that there is no limit to the amount of money that can be 
squeezed out of taxpayers, heavy federal taxation diminishes the practical 
ability of States to collect their own taxes.”172 In other words, where does 
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Justice Ginsburg think the states are going to turn for money if their own 
citizens have already been tapped out? 
Therefore, regardless of any leveraging by Congress, and regardless of 
any state reliance on a federal program, when the government offers or 
threatens to withhold a federal grant that is so large that a refusal of it would 
result in a huge tax increase, there is a strong case that coercion is present.173 
Once the joint dissent established its version of coercion, it then went on to 
explain why the Medicaid expansion clearly met this meaning.174 
3.  Why the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion is Coercive: 
Size 
Acknowledging the difficulty in determining when Congress has 
crossed the line from enticement to coercion, the joint dissent noted, 
“[C]ourts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional . . . unless 
the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”175 However, if it is not 
clear that Congress crossed the line into coercion in this case, “then there is 
no such [anticoercion] rule.”176 Using its own coercion analysis, the joint 
dissent found the threatened Medicaid grant significant.177 The reasoning 
behind this finding was the grant’s size and detrimental tax consequences.178 
Any state that declined the expansion and lost its original Medicaid grant 
would be unable to compensate its Medicaid program in state tax reve-
nues.179 Of course, the states could always raise additional revenue through 
taxation to fund their own Medicaid programs; however, this was not a real 
option.180 The joint dissent explained that “Medicaid has long been the larg-
est federal program of grants to the States[,]” and that “[t]he States devote a 
larger percentage of their budgets to Medicaid than to any other item.”181 For 
example, Arizona “commits 12% of its state expenditures to Medicaid, and 
relies on the Federal Government to provide the rest.”182 In fact, if Arizona 
lost its original federal Medicaid funding, it would “have to commit an addi-
tional 33% of all its state expenditures to fund an equivalent state pro-
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gram[,]” which would result in Arizona having “to allocate 45% of its annu-
al expenditures for that one purpose.”183  
Moreover, not only would a state have to pick up the slack with its own 
revenues to cover its significantly depleted Medicaid program, the state 
would still be required to follow other federal laws and fund those laws en-
tirely on its own.184 One example of this that the joint dissent thought was 
significant was the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA).185 This law requires hospitals to treat any indigent patient that 
comes into their emergency room needing assistance.186 With many of these 
indigent patients being covered by Medicaid, how could the government 
realistically expect a state to comply with EMTALA without any federal 
funding? 
With such a large amount of money at stake, the states could not seri-
ously refuse the expansion.187 They were simply not given a real choice in 
the matter.188 Rather, Congress put the states in a “damned if you do, 
damned if you don’t” situation with the Medicaid expansion, which accord-
ing to the joint dissent, constituted coercion.  
Additionally, the joint dissent found the Medicaid expansion coercive 
because Congress knew of the threatened Medicaid grant’s significance.189 
According to the joint dissent, Congress really showed its hand when it 
wrote the expansion because it crafted it in a way that practically admitted 
the states had no choice.190  
4.  Why the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion is Coercive: 
Congress Admitted there was No Choice 
The original Medicaid grant that Congress threatened to terminate was 
significant not only because it would result in an enormous loss to the states, 
but also because there was evidence that Congress knew how significant the 
potential loss of funding was.191 Although this was not a separate factor in 
and of itself, the joint dissent explained that the way Congress structured the 
Medicaid expansion was further evidence of significance.192 “The stated goal 
of the [Affordable Care Act] is near-universal health care coverage.”193 
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However, if a state actually chose to opt out of the expansion, where would 
persons whose income is below the federal poverty line and who could not 
afford private insurance go for health care coverage?194 Moreover, where 
would those groups who were eligible for the original Medicaid program go 
if the states that opted out of the expansion could not afford to keep the orig-
inal program running on their own?195 There was simply no legitimate back-
up plan for these vulnerable groups to turn to for health care coverage.196 
True, none of those people would be required to pay the penalty for not hav-
ing health insurance; however, that still would not change the fact that those 
individuals would be uninsured.197 Thus, why would Congress ever allow 
the primary goal of its legislation to be frustrated so easily? According to the 
joint dissent, there was no way Congress would seriously allow this to hap-
pen, and, in fact, that is precisely why Congress chose to write the Afforda-
ble Care Act the way that it did—a way in which states had no real 
choice.198 
The government attempted to defend itself by asserting that Congress 
was merely offering states an “exceedingly generous” gift with the expan-
sion; however, the joint dissent did not buy that explanation.199 To the con-
trary, if Congress was being so generous, then why the need for the threaten-
ing statutory language providing that the states would lose all of their Medi-
caid funds if they refused the expansion?200 Rather than threatening the 
states, Congress could have simply offered them new funding and condi-
tioned their acceptance of it on compliance with the Medicaid expansion’s 
terms.201 According to the joint dissent, the expansion was not tailored in 
that way because Congress never wanted to give the states a choice.202  
Furthermore, the joint dissenters found the expansion was not a gener-
ous gift at all. According to the joint dissent, there were many logical rea-
sons why a state would want to reject this so-called “exceedingly generous” 
gift.203 For example, although the government agreed that it would pay 
100% of the expansion’s costs, after 2019, that percentage would drop to 
90%.204 While this ten percent drop would still require the government to 
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pay the majority of the expansion’s costs, the states would still financially 
suffer as a result. To illustrate, after this ten percent drop occurred, state 
spending would be “projected to increase by at least $20 billion.”205 Consid-
ering the fact that many states are already running at significant budget defi-
cits, it was not difficult to see why an additional $20 billion loss to those 
states would not be regarded as a “generous gift.”206 Thus, because this seri-
ous downside for the states conflicted with Congress’s strong desire to 
achieve its goal of near-universal health care coverage, Congress obviously 
wrote the expansion in a way that would give the states no real option but 
acceptance.207 
All of this evidence of Congress’s intent cemented the joint dissent’s 
conclusion that the funding at stake was significant enough to constitute 
coercion.208 In the minds of the joint dissenters, Congress all but flat-out 
admitted it was coercing the states into expanding their Medicaid pro-
grams.209 Thus, this additional evidence of significance coupled with the size 
of the enormous loss in funding at stake led to the conclusion that the Medi-
caid expansion was an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending pow-
er.210 
Although the joint dissent and the plurality differ in their analysis, they 
both still contribute to the ultimate holding of NFIB v. Sebelius. However, 
when it comes to which opinion is binding, only one of the two opinions can 
control.  
C. Choosing an Opinion that Controls 
Although seven Justices concluded that the Medicaid expansion was 
coercive, those seven Justices were split between the two different coercion 
opinions—the plurality and the joint dissent.211 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Breyer, and Justice Kagan signed on to the plurality,212 while Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy signed on to the joint dissent.213 The final two 
remaining Justices that disagreed entirely with the other seven, and found 
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that the Medicaid expansion was not coercive, were Justice Ginsburg and 
Justice Sotomayor.214  
Out of the two possible controlling opinions, the lower courts will like-
ly follow the plurality’s opinion. Although Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Breyer, and Justice Kagan differed from Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor 
by finding the Medicaid expansion coercive, all five of those Justices ulti-
mately concluded that the expansion should remain in place and that the 
states should be provided with the opportunity to accept or reject the provi-
sion.215 In contrast, the four joint dissenters would not have given the states 
this opportunity because they invalidated the entire Affordable Care Act.216 
Furthermore, because the joint dissent’s opinion is much broader in scope 
than the plurality’s opinion, it essentially encompasses the plurality’s nar-
rower opinion.217 Thus, we can anticipate that those seven Justices would 
strike down any law that is unconstitutional under the plurality opinion, but 
only the four dissenters would strike down a law under the pure significance 
test for coercion articulated in the joint dissent.218 Finally, because the other 
two dissenting Justices, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, did not even find 
the expansion coercive, we can assume that if the three Justices of the plu-
rality opinion upheld a law as constitutional under their analysis, then Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would also find that law constitutional.219 
Therefore, the better view is that the plurality opinion is the governing law, 
and going forward, lower courts that want to avoid reversal on a spending 
clause issue should apply the plurality’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius.   
III. IMPLICATIONS FROM NFIB V. SEBELIUS 
Since the Supreme Court’s holding in National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business v. Sebelius,220 many have questioned whether its holding 
will remain limited to the uniquely large and entrenched Medicaid program 
or whether it will be looked back on as D-Day for Congress’s spending 
power.221 Because the plurality opinion should be the controlling opinion for 
lower courts, the more likely answer is the former. While the plurality did 
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not give us the clearest of coercion tests, it at least gave us something to 
work with: If Congress threatens to withhold a significant amount of a 
state’s federal funding in a heavily entrenched government program unless 
that state implements its new independent program, Congress has crossed 
the constitutional line from inducement to coercion.222 To determine whether 
the threatened federal funding meets the significance element of NFIB v. 
Sebelius, it is necessary to examine the size of the federal grant at stake and 
how reliant the states are on that grant in relation to its size.223 To determine 
whether Congress’s new condition is such a meaningful departure from the 
original program that it meets the independence element, it is necessary to 
analyze the kinds of changes Congress is making and how they govern the 
use of the federal funds at stake.224  
This section of the note will apply the two coercion elements from the 
plurality opinion to three different laws under which Congress has threat-
ened to withhold funding from the states if they do not comply with new 
conditions. The first law that this section will analyze is the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB),225 which requires “[s]tates to implement statewide ac-
countability systems [to] cover[] all public schools and students.”226 The 
next law that this section will analyze is the Clean Air Act (CAA)227—a law 
that “requires states and local communities to implement programs that help 
them meet national pollution limits.”228 The final law that this section will 
analyze is “Megan’s Law,” which requires states to report information about 
registered child sex offenders to certain agencies in order to receive federal 
law enforcement funding.229 Analysis of each of these laws using the plurali-
ty’s opinion will show that although these three laws could potentially be 
vulnerable under any interpretation of the plurality’s coercion test, a state’s 
chance at successfully challenging any of these laws is still quite low.  
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A. The No Child Left Behind Act 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) was enacted “to in-
crease the proficiency of students in underachieving school districts”230 by 
strengthening state accountability systems.231 NCLB has been said to have 
“changed the traditional role of the federal government in education.”232 The 
Supreme Court has even called NCLB “a dramatic shift in federal educa-
tional policy.”233 Due to the holding in NFIB v. Sebelius, NCLB is now more 
vulnerable to an attack under the spending clause than ever before.  
Because of the ever-evolving role that the federal government has 
played in state primary and secondary education policies, it was only a mat-
ter of time before Congress enacted something like NCLB. In 1980, Con-
gress and then-President Jimmy Carter converted the original 1867 Depart-
ment of Education into a cabinet-level department.234 Since then, the role of 
the federal government in state education has continued to grow.235 During 
the Cold War in 1958, “[t]o help ensure that highly trained individuals 
would be available to help America compete with the Soviet Union in scien-
tific and technical fields,” Congress passed its first comprehensive education 
legislation: The National Defense Education Act (NDEA).236 Then, in 1964, 
while still battling the Cold War, the United States chose to take on another 
war—“The War on Poverty.”237 To fight this War on Poverty, Congress en-
acted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).238 The largest 
funding program that Congress created under ESEA was Title I.239 Congress 
designed Title I with the purpose of “provid[ing] financial assistance . . . to 
local educational agencies [that] serv[ed] areas with concentrations of chil-
dren from low-income families; and . . . expand[ing] and improv[ing] their 
educational programs by various means . . . which contribute[d] particularly 
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to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived chil-
dren.”240  
However, after Congress reauthorized ESEA in 1988, it realized that 
Title I funding was only reaching twenty percent of the nation’s eligible 
students.241 Congress determined this was the cause of the “continuing 
achievement gap between students of different socio-economic, racial, eth-
nic, and language backgrounds,” and, therefore, Congress took a bolder step 
with its education policies.242 “[C]onsistent with its overarching theme of 
helping disadvantaged and underfunded schools, students, and parents 
alike[,]”243 Congress reauthorized Title I of ESEA as NCLB in 2002.244 By 
reauthorizing the ESEA into NCLB, Congress required states to comply 
with a number of new conditions in order for them to continue receiving 
federal education funds under Title I.245 The centerpiece for all of these new 
NCLB conditions was accountability.246 Congress wanted to demonstrate 
student progress through accountability reforms, rather than “focusing on 
how much money school districts spend on each child or ‘dictating funding 
levels.’”247 As Justice Sutton stated in his concurring opinion in School Dis-
trict of the City of Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States Department of 
Education,248  
[T]he act furthers an essential objective . . . of its title—that no child, 
whether living in inner-city school districts or not, whether suffering 
from learning disabilities or not, whether English is their second lan-
guage or not, whether otherwise disadvantaged or not, would be left be-
hind when it came to ensuring not just that more resources were devoted 
to their education but that objectively measurable progress would be 
made in their education.249 
By reauthorizing ESEA into NCLB, if the states desired to continue re-
ceiving Title I funding, that funding was on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with 
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NCLB. Thus, if a state chose to remain a recipient of federal Title I funding, 
it needed to opt in to NCLB. However, even if a state did not want to opt in 
to NCLB, it would have been difficult for it to decline the program because 
Title I funding “remains ‘the largest source of states’ elementary education 
funding from the federal government.’”250 
NCLB could prompt a coercion analysis because any state that does not 
want to accept the new version of ESEA—NCLB—faces losing essentially 
all of its federal education funds, with the exception of certain discretionary 
grant programs.251 Therefore, it is necessary to apply the plurality’s two-
element coercion test in order to determine whether NCLB would remain a 
constitutional use of Congress’s spending power.  
1. Significance 
Although the federal government provides a significant amount of Title 
I funding to the states, it is unlikely that its amount satisfies the plurality’s 
significance element. State funding under Title I of NCLB is “based on the 
amount of poor and disadvantaged children in the state.”252 “The average 
state receives nearly half a billion dollars each year under Title I and the 
[Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] [(IDEA)], and primary and 
secondary education makes up just under a fifth of the average state’s budg-
et.”253 Total federal funding for elementary and secondary education pro-
grams for fiscal year 2012 amounted to only a little over $35 billion.254 
While still a large amount of money, that is almost $198 billion less than the 
amount of federal funds that went to pre-expansion Medicaid.255 Moreover, 
unlike state Medicaid programs, which receive anywhere from fifty to 
eighty-three percent of their funding from the federal government,256 
“[s]tates and school districts remain responsible for the majority of [their] 
funding for public education.”257 Arizona, for example, receives “federal 
education funds [that] amount to only 9.8% of all state expenditures,” while 
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its federal Medicaid funds amount to 33% of its expenditures.258 Further-
more, although the federal government has been heavily involved in state 
primary and secondary education over the past few decades, the states are 
not significantly reliant on federal money. States receive considerably less 
federal funding under NCLB than Medicaid and the funds they do receive 
“are to be used only to implement Title I programming.”259 Thus, the states 
could probably not argue that their reliance on federal funds is heavy 
enough to rise to a “significant” level under the plurality’s opinion.   
Interestingly, there would be a much better chance that NCLB would 
fail if the joint dissent’s opinion, rather than the plurality’s opinion, was 
controlling in NFIB v. Sebelius. First, there are abundant similarities be-
tween NCLB and the joint dissent’s hypothetical. As the joint dissent con-
cluded, Congress merely offering the states a large federal grant could be 
considered coercive if a state’s failure to accept the grant would put its citi-
zens in a position of compensating that program with a considerable amount 
in federal taxes.260 Like the plurality opinion, however, the joint dissent did 
not leave much indication as to how large a federal grant or federal tax bur-
den would need to be in order to meet the significance element of coercion. 
Despite this, unlike the plurality, if the joint dissent did find the tax burden 
for rejecting the law significant, NCLB would be unconstitutional.  
Second, the argument that the states could simply increase their own 
tax revenues to compensate their loss in rejecting NCLB would not survive. 
Prior to NFIB v. Sebelius, Allison Quick, a former Harvard Law School stu-
dent, addressed this argument in a paper she wrote for a seminar class on 
federal budget policy.261 She concluded that the funds at stake under ESEA’s 
reauthorization into NCLB would not be significant enough to constitute 
coercion.262 To support her argument, she relied on the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals case, California v. United States,263 which held that California 
had a real choice in whether to remain a participant of the Medicaid program 
even if opting out of it would bankrupt its state because “a sovereign state . . 
. is always free to increase its tax revenues.”264 As is now known, Ms. Quick 
and the Ninth Circuit’s argument would not hold up under the joint dissent’s 
coercion analysis. Justice Ginsburg made the exact same point in NFIB v. 
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Sebelius, and the joint dissent shot it down because “heavy federal taxation 
diminishes the [States’ ability] . . . to collect their own taxes.”265  
Finally, the joint dissent might find further evidence of coercion, like it 
did in NFIB v. Sebelius, based on Congress’s underlying intent with the 
NCLB. Ms. Quick explained in her paper that after Congress passed NCLB 
in 2002, “[i]n January 2004, the Superintendent of Public Instruction in the 
Utah State Office of Education wrote a letter to the [U.S.] Secretary of Edu-
cation asking for an opinion on the consequences of potential nonparticipa-
tion by the state in [NCLB].”266 The Department of Education (DOE) re-
sponded a month later explaining that Utah could opt out of NCLB if it 
wished and still participate in separate discretionary grant programs, howev-
er, doing so would be “particularly detrimental.”267 For instance, the DOE 
explained that “opting out of Title I . . . would . . . jeopardiz[e] funding for a 
number of other programs because the funding formulas are linked.”268 
Statements like these from the DOE would suggest that, like in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, Congress wrote NCLB in such a way that it knew the states would 
be unable to reject it. Thus, if the joint dissent’s opinion were controlling, 
this further evidence would simply be icing on the cake for it to conclude 
that Congress was coercing the states into accepting NCLB.   
Nevertheless, as we know from NFIB v. Sebelius, the joint dissent’s 
opinion did not carry the day. Based on the plurality opinion’s coercion 
analysis and the figures above, it is unlikely that the threatened funding un-
der NCLB would rise to a requisite level of significance and be considered 
coercive. This is not to say the plurality’s holding in NFIB v. Sebelius did 
not at least open the door for a state to challenge a law like NCLB. After all, 
“[a]fter Medicaid, the next biggest federal funding item is aid to support 
elementary and secondary education.”269 However, the gap between federal 
funding for Medicaid and federal funding for primary and secondary educa-
tion still remains large and, while the states might be able to at least make a 
claim of coercion since NFIB v. Sebelius, they are still quite far off from 
having a strong case. Notwithstanding the fact that it would be difficult for a 
state to meet NFIB v. Sebelius’s significance element in challenging NCLB, 
for a full coercion analysis under the plurality’s opinion, it is still necessary 
to apply its independence element to NCLB. 
  
 265. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 n.13 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
 266. Quick, supra note 226, at 30. 
 267. Id. at 30–31. 
 268. Id. at 31. 
 269. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
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2. Independence 
In order to not confuse the understanding of the independence element, 
it is first necessary to start by applying the germaneness test. As previously 
explained, South Dakota v. Dole’s270 germaneness test is different from the 
independence element of coercion in NFIB v. Sebelius. 271 Rather than being 
an element of coercion, the test, like coercion, is a separate limitation on 
Congress’s spending clause power.272 To be germane, Congress’s “condition 
must be related, or have a nexus, to the purpose of the appropriation.”273 As 
Justice Sutton stated in his concurring opinion in Pontiac,  
Surely there is a legitimate connection between the Act’s funding and the 
conditions imposed on the States who accept it. Congress did not give 
the States federal money for education, then insist that they move the lo-
cation of their capitals or rename their state birds. Congress asked them 
to meet a series of educational requirements in return for receiving edu-
cation funding.274 
In fact, Congress’s stated purpose with NCLB “was to increase the pro-
ficiency of students in underachieving school districts, while simultaneously 
‘provid[ing] parents with options.’”275 Clearly there is a nexus between in-
creasing the proficiency of students in underachieving school districts and 
federal education funding, and, thus, NCLB meets the Dole germaneness 
test. However, because this test is different from the independence element 
discussed in NFIB v. Sebelius, a different analysis must be conducted to 
examine that element.  
When Congress amended ESEA to become NCLB, it created many 
new conditions for states to receive Title I funding. One of the new condi-
tions was that states submit accountability plans to the Secretary of Educa-
tion.276 These plans require that states create and maintain Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) programs that are designed to improve student academic 
proficiency rates.277 If a particular state’s school fails to meet the necessary 
  
 270. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 271. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.1. 
 272. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (“Third, our cases have suggested (without significant 
elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to 
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”).  
 273. W. Paul Koenig, Comment, Does Congress Abuse Its Spending Clause Power by 
Attaching Conditions on the Receipt of Federal Law Enforcement Funds to a State’s Compli-
ance with “Megan’s Law”?, 88 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 721, 746 (1998).  
 274. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 284 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring).  
 275. Caffrey, supra note 230, at 1131 (alteration in original). 
 276. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006). 
 277. Id. § 6316(b)(8).  
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AYP measurements, that school would be required to take certain actions 
such as replacing the school staff, instituting a new curriculum, and turning 
the operation of the school over to the state educational agency.278 Another 
new condition that Congress created under NCLB was that states prepare 
and disseminate annual state report cards.279 These report cards must contain 
information such as a comparison of student proficiency levels, the profes-
sional qualifications of teachers in the state, and trends in student achieve-
ment areas.280 Congress also required under NCLB that states in need of 
school improvement establish support teams.281 These teams must be com-
posed of knowledgeable individuals who can design and implement a plan 
to help the schools meet yearly progress reports and evaluate school person-
nel.282  
Given these extensive new conditions under NCLB, one might argue 
the new conditions are so distinct that they are independent of the original 
Title I funding, and Congress is using the old Title I funding as leverage for 
the states’ acceptance of NCLB. Like the Medicaid expansion, many new 
provisions were created under NCLB. Moreover, these new NCLB provi-
sions are more distinct than former new provisions because they create a 
significant amount of different and additional work for states that want to 
receive Title I funding.283 In fact, the Supreme Court itself has stated that 
NCLB is a “dramatic shift in federal educational policy.”284 Because states 
cannot continue to receive Title I funding without accepting the new NCLB 
conditions, one could argue that Congress is using future Title I funding as 
leverage to force the states into accepting this new, independent NCLB pro-
gram.  
On the other hand, however, one could also argue that NCLB’s condi-
tions are not independent because they are not distinct and separate enough 
from the original ESEA conditions. In NFIB v. Sebelius, the plurality did not 
find the Medicaid expansion to be an independent program simply because 
  
 278. Id. See also Quick, supra note 226, at 28–29.  
 279. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(1), (h) (2006).  
 280. See id. § 6311(h)(1)(C). Aside from the required information that must be provided 
in school report cards under § 6311(h)(1)(C), schools may provide other optional information 
in their annual state report cards such as attendance rates, average class sizes, and the extent 
of parent involvement as well. See id. § 6311(h)(1)(D).  
 281. Id. § 6317(a) (2006).  
 282. Id. § 6317(a)(5)(A).  
 283. A significant amount of this additional work involves school districts attempting to 
meet the many unattainable achievement levels under NCLB. See Caffrey, supra note 224, at 
1133–36. As a result of this different and additional work, many states have been put in the 
position of trying to come up with additional money to fund NCLB. See id. at 1137–38. This 
has been the result because the government significantly undershot how much Title I funding 
would be necessary to allocate for the states that accepted NCLB. Id.  
 284. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 461 (2009). 
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Congress added a new group of “needy individuals” to the original Medicaid 
program.285 It was also the size of that new group, how that group would be 
funded, and the difference in health insurance that group would receive that 
caused the plurality to find the Medicaid expansion was an entirely separate 
health insurance program.286 Perhaps if the Medicaid expansion had instead 
required the original Medicaid program to encompass a much smaller group, 
such as unemployed former law professors, rather than all people 133% 
below the poverty line, the plurality would not have concluded that the ex-
pansion was “an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide uni-
versal health insurance.”287 Thus, one could argue that the NCLB’s changes 
to ESEA are not similar enough to the Medicaid expansion’s changes to the 
original Medicaid program to become independent. Furthermore, although 
NCLB does add significant requirements for states to implement in order to 
receive future Title I funding, even if Congress allocates more funding for 
those requirements, they will all still be paid for under the banner of Title I 
funding.288 Thus, unlike the Medicaid expansion, NCLB conditions restrict 
how Title I funding is to be used.289 Therefore, one could just as easily argue 
that the new NCLB conditions are not so distinct from the original condi-
tions under ESEA that they amount to an independent program on their own.  
Despite these two competing arguments, the structure of NCLB might 
actually cause the law to survive the independence inquiry altogether. Pro-
fessor Samuel R. Bagenstos persuasively argues that reauthorization of a 
law matters when analyzing the plurality’s two-part coercion test in NFIB v. 
  
 285. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–09 (2012) (Roberts, 
C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 286. Id. at 2606. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6302 (2006).  
 289. Compare NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by 
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (using South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) as an analogy to 
show that the Medicaid expansion does not govern how original Medicaid funds are used), 
and Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 918–19 (explaining that the plurality found independence 
occurs when the new conditions do not govern how the threatened funding is to be used), 
with Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 258–59 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (“[T]he funds distributed under Title I are to be used only to implement Title 
I programming, not to replace funds already being used for general programming.”), and 20 
U.S.C. § 6302 (2006) (listing the numerous appropriations for each fiscal year and their re-
spective subsections that each amount of funds will go towards). Unlike NCLB, which gov-
erns how schools are to use their threatened Title I funds, the threatened Medicaid funds in 
NFIB v. Sebelius were contingent upon states accepting and using entirely different federal 
money to create a less comprehensive Medicaid benefit package for new Medicaid expansion 
recipients. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.).  
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Sebelius.290 Under its spending power, Congress must “ensure[] that funds 
are spen[t] according to its view of the ‘general Welfare.’”291 Citing former 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Professor Bagenstos ex-
plains that Congress’s understanding of the general welfare is constantly 
changing.292 This constant change can be caused by a number of reasons 
such as political party differences and unforeseen consequences of a law. As 
history has shown, neither the Republicans nor the Democrats alone have 
consistently controlled our branches of government. If citizens are unhappy 
with their politicians or a certain political party, they can act on their feel-
ings through our democratic voting process. Sometimes a citizen’s issue will 
not be with either political party but instead with a particular law. In that 
case, the citizen could relay any concerns about the law to his or her federal 
representatives, and those representatives could then amend the law accord-
ingly. These examples are just a few of the ways that show why the Su-
preme Court has never viewed Congress’s understanding of the general wel-
fare as static, and Professor Bagenstos explains that this view did not change 
after NFIB v. Sebelius.293  
Given the precedence of this longstanding view of the general welfare, 
the plurality seemed to acknowledge that Congress could have constitution-
ally repealed the old Medicaid program and then enacted an entirely new 
program that contained both old Medicaid and Medicaid expansion condi-
tions.294 This procedure of repealing and replacing a law can be seen as a 
  
 290. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 870–71, 910 (implying that reauthorization does not 
involve the type of cross-program leveraging that occurred with the Medicaid expansion in 
NFIB v. Sebelius).  
 291. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.).  
 292. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 885–87.  
 293. See id. 
 294. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 n.14; see also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 885. Pro-
fessor Bagenstos points out, however, that Chief Justice Roberts noted that repealing and 
replacing the Medicaid law would “not be that easy.” Id. Professor Bagenstos admits it is 
hard to decipher exactly what the Chief Justice was implying with this statement. Id. It is 
certainly true that regardless of the possible political difficulties with repealing and replacing 
Medicaid, the Chief Justice would require Congress to go through that process rather than 
engage in coercion through its use of the Medicaid expansion. After all, even if the result 
would be the same, these are the types of checks and balances on federal power that our 
government is designed to have. Even so, however, given the phraseology of the opinion, it 
remains questionable how sympathetic the Chief Justice would really be to a repealed and 
replaced version of Medicaid. E-mail from Joshua M. Silverstein, Professor of Law, UALR 
William H. Bowen School of Law, to Ellen K. Howard, Law Student, UALR William H. 
Bowen School of Law (Feb. 20, 2013, 12:45 PM) (on file with author). Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s statement is also worth questioning because of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
Id. Although this doctrine focuses on the relationship between individuals and the govern-
ment, it would be unsurprising to see the Court apply the doctrine to federalism and enumer-
ated powers disputes between the federal government and a state. Id. But see Pace v. Bo-
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close parallel to reauthorization of a law—particularly, a law such as 
NCLB.295 Professor Bagenstos explains that at the core of the plurality’s 
independence element is this idea of “cross-program leveraging.”296 With 
cross-program leveraging, there are two programs in play and Congress is 
using the funds of one of the programs as leverage for the other.297 Professor 
Bagenstos explains that cross-program leveraging cannot occur when Con-
gress repeals and replaces a law or reauthorizes a law because, in each in-
stance, there is only one law being created, and that law alone is on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis.298 Furthermore, reauthorization may also be somewhat 
different because a key feature of the process is a program’s inevitable ter-
mination if Congress does nothing.299  
Neither reauthorization feature applied to the Medicaid expansion in 
NFIB v. Sebelius. In NFIB v. Sebelius, two programs were at issue, an old 
Medicaid program and new Medicaid expansion program, and the former 
was being used as leverage for the latter.300 Congress, however, did not use 
this same technique with ESEA’s Title I funding and NCLB.301 By reauthor-
izing ESEA into NCLB, Congress was not leveraging the states’ future Title 
I funding under the old ESEA program upon their acceptance of a new 
NCLB program.302 Rather, because of the process of reauthorization, NCLB 
itself would now be the law, and the states that wanted to continue receiving 
  
galusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 286–287 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court has never applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a dispute between sover-
eigns; further concluding that, in the spending context, the doctrine is “subsumed” by the 
coercion element of Dole). For further explanation of this doctrine, see infra text accompany-
ing note 409. At some point, the line starts to break down between repealing a program and 
starting over, and cross leveraging one program with another. See E-mail from Joshua M. 
Silverstein to Ellen K. Howard, supra. Perhaps it would also be the case that the Chief Justice 
was simply throwing his statement about the difficulty out there and implying that he would 
discuss the constitutional implications of repealing and replacing Medicaid, but there is no 
need because the likelihood of Congress repealing and replacing Medicaid is slim-to-none. 
Because it is uncertain what exactly the Chief Justice meant with this statement, for the sake 
of argument, probably the best we can do is take the statement at its face value—Congress 
can still constitutionally repeal and enact an entirely new Medicaid law.  
 295. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 885, 909–10 (“As I argued in Part II.B. . . . .”).  
 296. See id. at 870–71.  
 297. Id.  
 298. Compare id. (“Congress did not merely change the terms of the ongoing Medicaid 
program but . . . it allowed states to remain in that program only if they would agree also to 
participate in . . . a separate and independent program.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 910 
(“[U]nder that proposal there would effectively be no Title I program . . . .”).  
 299. See E-mail from Professor Joshua M. Silverstein to Ellen K. Howard, supra note 
294.  
 300. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 891–92.  
 301. See id. at 910–11.  
 302. See id. at 910 (“NCLB itself—laws in which Congress decided that it would no 
longer fund preexisting programs unless they assumed a fundamentally different form.”). 
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Title I funding could take it or leave it.303 Furthermore, if Congress never 
reauthorized ESEA into NCLB, and simply did nothing, there would be no 
Title I funding for the states to receive in the future anyway.304 Title I fund-
ing would essentially end without reauthorization.305  
Because there is no cross-program leveraging occurring with NCLB, it 
is irrelevant whether the ESEA assumed a fundamentally different form 
under NCLB.306 When Congress reauthorized ESEA into NCLB, Congress 
was simply “governing the use of funds” according to its current under-
standing of the general welfare.307 Professor Bagenstos argues that this read-
ing of NFIB v. Sebelius must necessarily follow because otherwise “Con-
gress’s authority to tailor spending to its current understanding of what 
serves the general welfare [would be undercut]—an authority that Chief 
Justice Roberts expressly endorsed.”308  
3. Conclusion 
NCLB is overdue for reauthorization again, and many of Congress’s 
new proposals for the act could impose major new requirements on states.309 
Before the 2012 Presidential Election, Governor Mitt Romney, the 2012 
Republican presidential candidate, had a long list of new conditions for Title 
I of NCLB that he wanted to require of states if he were elected.310 Some of 
these conditions included “portable” vouchers, open-enrollment policies, 
and online schooling—all of which would be required for states to accept if 
they wished to continue receiving federal education funds.311 If the current 
Congress has anything like Governor Romney’s proposals in mind when it 
comes time to reauthorize NCLB, while a state would now at least have a 
coercion argument under NFIB v. Sebelius, given the analysis above it is 
unlikely that a state would win. The better conclusion under the plurality’s 
analysis is that a court would find that a reauthorization of NCLB—even 
with major changes—does not constitute coercion. A court would probably 
  
 303. See id.  
 304. See E-mail from Professor Joshua M. Silverstein to Ellen K. Howard, supra note 
294. 
 305. In fact, funding under NCLB expired in 2007, and President Barack Obama and 
Congress have been discussing measures to take to reauthorize the law ever since then. Joy 
Resmovits, No Child Left Behind Vote in House Passes Substitute, Shifting Away from Bush’s 
Education Vision, HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2012, 11:22 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/19/no-child-left-behind-vote_n_3623100.html. 
 306. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 892.  
 307. Id. at 910. 
 308. Id.  
 309. Id. at 907.  
 310. Id.  
 311. Id.  
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find this way because ESEA’s reauthorization into NCLB would not meet 
the independence element, and federal education funding does not rise to the 
requisite level of significance under NFIB v. Sebelius.  
If the states really want out of NCLB today, their better option, and one 
that many—including Arkansas—are currently exercising, is to seek waivers 
of the law.312 In fact, the Obama Administration has been very lenient in 
granting waivers to states that want to be released from NCLB313—so long 
as those states agree, in exchange for those waivers, to accept his admin-
istration’s education policies, which some argue has legal issues of its 
own.314 Nevertheless, considering all of the extreme and imminent financial 
penalties that many states face due to their failure to meet NCLB standards, 
the waivers may still be the better option rather than waiting around to chal-
lenge Congress on its next reauthorization of NCLB.  
B. The Clean Air Act 
Another law that could face legal challenges after NFIB v. Sebelius is 
The Clean Air Act (CAA).315 The CAA requires that each state submit a 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) to the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) within three years after the promulgation of pri-
mary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).316 
These SIPs must meet the minimum requirements of the primary and sec-
ondary NAAQS317 and must include items such as enforceable emission 
limitations, schedules and timetables for compliance, and provisions that 
provide for the establishment and operation of appropriate systems that 
monitor ambient air quality data.318 If any state fails to submit a SIP, submits 
an inadequate SIP, or is not implementing a requirement of its SIP, the Ad-
ministrator is required to impose sanctions on that state.319 The Administra-
tor may impose sanctions that deny the noncomplying state any projects or 
  
 312. Education Week, NCLB Waivers: A State-by-State Breakdown, VISUALIZING.ORG 
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.visualizing.org/visualizations/nclb-waivers-state-state-
breakdown.  
 313. Motoko Rich, ‘No Child’ Law Whittled Down by White House, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/education/no-child-left-
behind-whittled-down-under-obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 314. See Lindsey Burke, No Child Left Behind Waivers: Bogus Relief, Genuine Over-
reach, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/no-child-left-behind-waivers-bogus-relief-
genuine-overreach.  
 315. See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 316. Id. § 7410(a)(1) (2006); see also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 917.  
 317. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(1)(A)–(B); id. § 7511 (2006). 
 318. See id. § 7410(a)(2).  
 319. See id. § 7509(a) (2006).  
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highway grants that the Secretary of Transportation has awarded to it for its 
“nonattainment areas.”320 Nonattainment areas are areas that do not meet the 
primary or secondary NAAQS and also include stationary sources.321 The 
Administrator, however, is barred from denying the noncomplying state any 
federal highway grants or projects that have the principal purpose of im-
proving highway safety.322 The Administrator is also barred from denying 
the noncomplying state certain federal grants or projects that help reduce 
emissions.323 Some of these exclusions include capital programs for public 
transit, construction of roads for the use of high occupancy vehicles, and 
programs that improve traffic flow.324 There are also times when these SIPs 
have the possibility of being suspended for emergency situations.325 If any 
state’s governor petitions the President of the United States to temporarily 
suspend any part of a SIP based on a national or regional energy emergency, 
the President has the discretion to allow that temporary suspension.326 Ex-
cept for the few safety and energy exceptions, and severe emergency situa-
tions, the Administrator may revoke the noncomplying state’s federal high-
way projects or funding until he or she “determines that the state has come 
into compliance.”327    
Congress’s tailoring of the CAA would certainly prompt a coercion 
analysis because Congress is threatening to take away a state’s federal 
highway funding if that state does not implement Congress’s condition of 
NAAQS. Thus, in applying the plurality’s coercion test to the CAA, it is 
necessary to determine the significance of the highway funds that the Ad-
ministrator could revoke and the independence of the condition (the 
NAAQS) from the highway funding.  
1. Significance 
While the plurality did not specify exactly how significant a federal 
grant would need to be to constitute coercion, it did leave a number of clues 
as to how future courts might determine this element. For example, one of 
the reasons the plurality found the original Medicaid funds significant was 
because Congress threatened to revoke the entire grant.328 The CAA differs 
  
 320. Id. § 7509(b)(1)(A).  
 321. See id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (“any area”). 
 322. Id. § 7509(b)(1). 
 323. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B).  
 324. Id. For the full list, see id. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(i)–(viii).  
 325. Id. § 7410(f) (2006).  
 326. Id. 
 327. See id. § 7509(a)(4)–(b)(1).  
 328. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) 
(plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
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in this respect because the Administrator is barred from revoking all of a 
state’s federal highway funds.329 There are certain grants and projects that 
promote highway safety and emission reduction that the Administrator is not 
allowed to touch when he or she is imposing sanctions on a noncomplying 
state.330   
There were two additional reasons that the original Medicaid grant at 
stake was significant enough to constitute coercion: (1) The amount an aver-
age state devoted to its overall budget in Medicaid spending, and (2) the 
amount the federal government contributed to that spending.331 Based on 
these two reasons, there is a very low possibility that a court would ever find 
that the federal highway funds at stake under the CAA rise to a level of 
“significance.” Medicaid spending accounts for more than 20% of the aver-
age state’s overall budget.332 This is almost triple the average state budget’s 
transportation spending, which amounted to only 7.4% in fiscal year 2011.333 
Moreover, out of that 7.4%, only 32.1% of it is covered by federal funds,334 
which is less than a third of the average state’s transportation spending.335 
This is significantly less than the 50% to 83% of funds that the federal gov-
ernment contributes to the average state budget’s 20% in Medicaid spend-
ing336 and amounts to nearly two-thirds of the average state’s overall Medi-
caid spending.337  
The federal highway funds that a state stands to lose under the CAA 
become even more insignificant when it is also taken into consideration that 
Administrator would probably not revoke the full 32.1% of federal funds. At 
least some of those funds would probably be designated for safety or emis-
sion reduction, which the Administrator is denied power over.338 In contrast, 
if a state rejected the Medicaid expansion and, thus, lost all of its federal 
Medicaid funds, it could potentially lose over ten percent of its entire state 
  
 329. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) (“The Administrator may impose a prohibition . . . other 
than projects or grants for safety . . . . [i]n addition to safety . . . .”). 
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budget.339 To further contrast this point, in Dole, South Dakota’s potential 
loss of less than half of one percent of its overall state budget was not signif-
icant enough to constitute coercion.340 Needless to say, if the federal high-
way funds at stake under the CAA were placed on a significance balancing 
scale—Dole being the insignificant side and NFIB v. Sebelius being the sig-
nificant side—they would more likely lean towards Dole.  
A final reason that the plurality found the size of the original federal 
Medicaid grant significant was because of the states’ reliance on that en-
trenched federal grant.341 The states had, for many years now, used their 
federal Medicaid funds to develop intricate statutory and administrative 
schemes, and if those funds were terminated, their efforts would become 
futile.342 Professor Jonathan Adler notes that states are heavily reliant on 
federal funds in their transportation budgets.343 Professor Adler explains that 
“[h]ighway funds are raised from a dedicated revenue source in gasoline 
taxes and placed in the Highway Trust Fund[,]” which for many states, “rep-
resent[s] the lion’s share of their transportation budget.”344 He argues that 
“[a]s a consequence, threatening to take highway funds may strike some 
courts as unduly coercive under [NFIB v. Sebelius].”345 However, even if the 
states are heavily reliant on these federal highway grants, their reliance is 
probably still not enough to constitute “significance.” The plurality seems to 
be much more likely to find the significance element met if the states were 
not just heavily reliant, but heavily reliant on a large federal grant. In other 
words, the larger the threatened federal grant, the more likely coercion is 
present. In the fiscal year of 2011, only 32.1% of state expenditures for 
transportation came from federal funding,346 which is significantly lower 
than the 50% to 83% of federal funds that went to state Medicaid expendi-
tures.347 Moreover, the average state spends only 7.4% of its budget on 
transportation,348 which is well below the 20% spent on Medicaid.349 While 
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there is definitely a real argument to be made that the amount of federal 
highway funds that could be terminated under the CAA is significant 
enough to constitute coercion, the stronger argument is that the threat to 
revoke those funds would only constitute “mild encouragement.”350 For pur-
poses of this coercion analysis, however, it is still necessary to analyze the 
independence element from the plurality’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius. 
2. Independence 
Again, it is helpful to start this section with an application of the ger-
maneness test in order not to confuse the understanding of independence. A 
condition can be germane to one of the purposes of the threatened federal 
funding while at the same time be completely independent from that fund-
ing.351 In Dole, Congress’s condition that called “upon states to raise [their] 
drinking age[s]” was germane because it “echoed the explicit purposes of 
the federal highway programs—safe highways[;]”352 and in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, the Medicaid expansion met the germaneness test because it was 
related to the purpose of the original Medicaid program—providing 
healthcare to the nation’s poor.353 The CAA’s requirement that states submit 
SIPs that comply with NAAQS would meet the germaneness test “because 
both automobiles and stationary sources contribute to ‘the overall problem 
of air pollution.’”354 
At the same time, however, the CAA conditions could also be inde-
pendent from the threatened federal highway grants. If the states choose to 
challenge the CAA’s condition in the lower court systems, the courts could 
find that, like the Medicaid expansion, the CAA’s SIP requirements are in-
dependent of the threatened grant. The states would need to argue that Con-
gress is continuing to fund essentially the same highway program, under 
essentially the same rules as it did before, but now it is requiring that if 
states wish to continue that program, they must agree to implement the 
CAA’s new and separate SIP program.355 This argument would probably 
succeed. Like the conditions in Dole and NFIB v. Sebelius, the condition 
under the CAA is not a restriction on how the highway funds are to be 
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used.356 In Dole, for example, the threatened federal highway funds were 
used for improving and maintaining specific highways, and Congress’s re-
quirement that the states raise their drinking ages had nothing to do with that 
use.357 Similarly, in NFIB v. Sebelius, the plurality concluded that the inde-
pendence element was met because rather than governing the use of the 
original Medicaid funding, Congress threatened to terminate that funding if 
the states did not accept a new program that came with new recipients, new 
funding, and new coverage plans.358 The plurality found that this represented 
such significant growth in the original Medicaid program that the expansion 
was, in reality, a completely different program.359 
Although the CAA’s condition of requiring states to submit SIPs does 
not exactly mirror the Medicaid expansion, those requirements, at least for 
stationary sources of pollution, “do not govern how states should construct 
and maintain highways.”360 Additionally, Professor Bagenstos explains that 
those requirements also do not “govern the use of the highways constructed 
or maintained with federal funds[,]” or even “which highways to construct 
and maintain.”361 To illustrate, suppose the Secretary of Transportation allot-
ted highway funding for states to repaint their highway ramps. Under the 
CAA, because this is not one of the specified safety or emission reduction 
projects, the Administrator would have free reign in his or her decision to 
revoke it. If a state’s SIP failed to meet the required NAAQS because of 
some stationary source of pollution, like a bakery, the Administrator would 
be allowed to revoke that state’s project to repaint its highway ramps362 
when that bakery’s emissions had nothing to do with the funding for that 
project—they were completely independent of each other.363 Similarly, in 
NFIB v. Sebelius, if a state chose to decline the Medicaid expansion, it 
would have lost all of its original Medicaid funding when that expansion 
had nothing to do with the original funding in the first place.364 Under the 
plurality opinion, neither one of these scenarios would be acceptable be-
cause they each involve Congress using funding from one program as lever-
age for states to accept an independent program, which constitutes coercion 
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when coupled with significance.365 Therefore, due to these important simi-
larities between the Medicaid expansion and the CAA’s condition, and their 
relation to federal funding, a state that challenges the CAA’s condition 
would have a strong argument that the condition is independent of its federal 
highway funding. 
3. Conclusion  
It is likely that the CAA’s condition would meet the independence el-
ement of plurality’s coercion test but fail its significance element. It remains 
unclear how exactly courts will interpret the plurality’s opinion, or whether 
it would even apply to the CAA at all. Professor Bagenstos argues that the 
plurality meant it when it said that for coercion to be present, both elements 
of the coercion test in NFIB v. Sebelius must be met.366 Specifically, 
“[c]oercion is present only when the new condition ties continued participa-
tion in an entrenched and lucrative funding program to a state’s agreement 
also to participate in a separate and independent program.”367 Under his in-
terpretation, Congress’s condition under the CAA should still likely survive 
because, while the highway funds are independent from the condition, there 
is far less money and reliance at stake to meet the significance element un-
der NFIB v. Sebelius.368 Because the amount of funds being threatened under 
the CAA simply does not rise to the requisite level of significance described 
in NFIB v. Sebelius, the states would be able to reject the CAA’s condition 
not just in theory, but also in fact.  
However, Professor Bagenstos declined to find, even under his inter-
pretation of NFIB v. Sebelius, that a case against the CAA would be a slam-
dunk for the federal government: “[b]ecause it is unclear at exactly what 
point a state should be understood to lack a real choice to refuse a federal 
grant, it is impossible to predict precisely how courts will apply NFIB to the 
CAA.”369 Rather, he concluded that when NFIB v. Sebelius is applied to 
laws like the CAA, the states will have stronger bargaining power: 
[I]f the Administrator were to shut off all federal highway funds to a 
state based on the state’s failure to provide a sufficient response to sta-
tionary sources of pollution, her actions would raise serious questions 
under the Chief Justice’s opinion. That is not to say that those actions 
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would be unconstitutional. . . . But . . . the federal executive may not 
want to take the chance that courts will disagree.370 
Another interpretation that could develop from the plurality’s coercion 
test is the application of principles from the doctrine of unconscionability.371 
For the doctrine to apply, both procedural and substantive unconscionability 
must be present.372 Unlike typical element structures used throughout the 
common law, however, there is a sliding scale with the two 
unconscionability elements.373 This means that the more one element of 
unconscionability is present, the less we need of other.374 If this type of 
structure operates in the spending clause context, then the more a court finds 
a spending condition independent of the original spending program that 
Congress claims it modifies, the less necessary it will be for that court to 
find the threatened funds significant. Of course, the same would be true if 
the outcome of the elements was reversed in that situation. Applying these 
principles to the plurality’s holding and to the CAA’s condition might 
strengthen the states’ argument. Although there might be only a small 
amount of significance present, because the level of independence is so 
great, the states would have a stronger argument that the CAA’s conditions 
are coercive and thus, an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending pow-
er.   
Despite all of this, some law professors have argued that the NFIB v. 
Sebelius holding would not even apply to the CAA because the Medicaid 
expansion and the CAA are too distinct. Professor Jonathan Zasloff argues 
that the CAA and the Medicaid expansion in NFIB v. Sebelius are distinct 
from each other because Medicaid is an entitlement program in which feder-
al funds flow automatically, and federal highway spending requires Con-
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gress to appropriate money annually.375 States have relied on federal Medi-
caid grants for decades, so Congress’s threat to revoke that funding seems 
much more coercive than a threat to revoke federal highway funds in which 
states have less of an expectation.376 According to Professor Zasloff, the 
states are accustomed to Congress apportioning federal highway funds to 
them every year and “always are on the alert”—this is not the case for Med-
icaid.377 While Professor Zasloff even questions himself as to whether “this 
[is] a distinction without a difference,” he notes that there is at least prece-
dent for his distinction.378 He used the case of Goldberg v. Kelly379 to explain 
the distinction: 
[The Supreme Court] held that AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children] benefits constituted “property” within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause, and thus an AFDC recipient had a right to a hearing be-
fore they were cut off. Central to Goldberg was the notion that AFDC 
was an entitlement, and thus it generated reasonable expectations under 
recipients.380 
Although he admits that “Goldberg’s notion of an entitlement is some-
what different than [NFIB v. Sebelius’s], . . . it is not really that different 
than the normal sort of analogical reasoning traditional[ly] used by courts[,] 
[and] [m]oreover, the terseness of the Chief Justice’s opinion pretty much 
requires this.”381 
While it is unclear how exactly future courts will interpret the plurali-
ty’s coercion test for the CAA, or whether NFIB v. Sebelius would even be 
applicable to the CAA, one thing is certain: NFIB v. Sebelius has opened up 
the possibility that a state challenging the CAA’s conditions will have a 
fighting chance in the federal court systems. 
C. “Megan’s Law” 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was an outbreak of violent sex-
ual crimes against children.382 The media reported one child after another 
who were kidnapped, violently raped, and then brutally murdered by previ-
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ously convicted child sex offenders.383 This sparked outrage by the parents 
of the victims and the rest of the American public.384 They asserted that “if 
they had known the danger posed by their previously convicted [sex offend-
er] neighbors, they [might] have been able to protect [the] children.”385 This 
prompted the politicians in Washington to respond by enacting law en-
forcement laws, which is an area that is traditionally left up to state regula-
tion.386 One of the first laws that emerged from the public’s outcry was 
“Megan’s Law.”387 This law was named after Megan Kanka, a seven-year-
old girl, who was one of the highly publicized victims of this sexual preda-
tor epidemic in the late 80s and 90s.388  
Under Megan’s Law, Congress provides states with the incentive to 
“implement a system where all persons who commit sexual or kidnapping 
crimes against children or who commit sexually violent crimes against any 
person (whether adult or child) are required to register their address with the 
state upon their release from prison.”389 If a state chooses to implement Me-
gan’s Law, “immediately after a sex offender registers or updates [his or 
her] registration [information], an appropriate [state] official . . .  [is then 
required to] provide the [offender’s registry] information . . . to” a number 
of different agencies.390 Some of which include school and public housing 
agencies; social service agencies responsible for protecting minors in the 
child welfare system; and volunteer organizations that have contact with 
minors and other vulnerable individuals.391 If a state that agreed to this con-
dition fails to provide the sex offender’s information to the appropriate 
agencies, it faces losing ten percent of its annual funds from the Edward 
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (JAG).392 States use this 
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funding for necessities such as law enforcement programs, prosecution and 
court programs, prevention and education programs, etc.393 
Like NCLB and the CAA, Megan’s Law would at least prompt a coer-
cion analysis because Congress is threatening to take away a state’s law 
enforcement funding if it does not implement the law’s condition of supply-
ing sex predator information to certain agencies. Thus, in order to discover 
whether Megan’s Law would survive the plurality’s coercion test, it is nec-
essary to determine the significance of JAG and the independence of Me-
gan’s Law from that grant. 
1. Significance 
JAG is said to provide “the leading source of federal justice funding to 
state, tribal, and local jurisdictions.”394 The vast majority of the grant goes 
toward state law enforcement funding.395 In fact, sixty-two percent of JAG 
from the fiscal years of 2009-2011 went solely to funding state law en-
forcement programs.396 The size of the JAG grant differs from year to 
year.397 Congress bases the amount of the JAG grant for each fiscal year on 
an eligibility formula that takes into account the individual population of 
each state and the total population of the United States.398 In addition to 
populations, the formula requires that the average annual number of violent 
crimes for each state individually, and also collectively as a whole, be calcu-
lated to determine JAG funding.399 Based on this formula, Congress allocat-
ed over $423 million for the JAG grant in 2009.400 In 2010, it allocated over 
$349 million, and in 2011, over $225 million, totaling over $998 million in 
the past three fiscal years.401  
Although within the fiscal years of 2009-2011 Congress allocated al-
most a billion dollars in JAG grants to the states, that amount does not hold 
a candle to federal Medicaid funding. In the fiscal year of 2010 alone, Con-
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gress allocated more than $233 billion to the original Medicaid program.402 
Thus, what the states received in pre-expansion Medicaid funding in one 
year is almost twenty-three times the amount they received from the JAG 
grant in three years. Moreover, “[t]he Federal Government estimates that it 
will pay out approximately $3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019 in order to 
cover the costs of pre-expansion Medicaid.”403 Clearly, based on the eligibil-
ity formula, Congress would never come close to paying that amount in JAG 
funding.  
Furthermore, unlike with the Medicaid expansion, under Megan’s Law, 
the states that fail to provide sex offenders’ information to the specified 
agencies do not stand to lose all of their JAG funds. Rather, all a state stands 
to lose is ten percent of whatever amount it received from that grant for that 
year.404 A ten percent loss of state JAG funding is closer in amount to what 
South Dakota stood to lose in Dole than what an average state stood to lose 
in NFIB v. Sebelius. The average state that rejected the Medicaid expansion 
in NFIB v. Sebelius stood to lose over ten percent of its entire state budg-
et.405 This loss was much more significant than South Dakota’s potential loss 
of less than half of one percent of its total state budget in Dole.406 Based on 
Congress’s formula and the amount of funding it allocates for JAG each 
year, it is much more likely that the average state’s budget loss would be 
closer to South Dakota’s, and thus, pales in comparison to the funding that 
was at stake in NFIB v. Sebelius. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that a 
court would find the JAG grant under Megan’s Law significant enough to 
constitute coercion. If the size of the grant was the only coercion element in 
NFIB v. Sebelius, it would not even be necessary to consider independence 
because the states would still have a real choice in whether or not to follow 
the requirements under Megan’s Law. 
Interestingly enough, however, back in 1998, attorney Paul Koenig 
wrote an article about Congress’s spending clause power and its connection 
to Megan’s Law.407 This article grappled with many of the same arguments 
identified in NFIB v. Sebelius. At that time, although Mr. Koenig came to 
the ultimate conclusion that Megan’s Law was a constitutional use of Con-
gress’s spending power,408 he was skeptical of both this conclusion and the 
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Supreme Court’s holding in Dole.409 At one point in the article, Mr. Koenig 
appeared to be channeling the plurality’s coercion analysis in NFIB v. 
Sebelius: 
At least in theory, states can choose to refuse to release [a sex offender’s] 
information and forego the federal funds. . . . However, this distinction 
becomes less clear if the enticement of federal funds becomes so strong 
that it presents the states with no realistic choice. If the states are suffi-
ciently dependent on the federal funds, it may not matter that they have 
choice in theory. In reality, the “enticement” in Megan’s Law may leave 
the states with as little choice as the federal coercion in Printz. This 
would occur if the states were so reliant on the federal funds that they 
felt compelled to adhere to whatever terms the federal government in-
cluded in its conditions.410  
Of course, as already demonstrated, because the size of the JAG grant 
is not even in the same ballpark as the size of the federal Medicaid grant, it 
is highly unlikely that states could demonstrate enough reliance for courts to 
find the threat of losing the JAG grant significant. It is not just the reliance 
itself that seemed to matter to the plurality. Rather, it was a state’s reliance 
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on a program that is so large in size that was important.411 Thus, states 
would have a difficult time demonstrating that they were so heavily reliant 
on a grant that is so small in size.  
In addition to the plurality’s coercion analysis, Mr. Koenig, along with 
other legal scholars, channeled the joint dissent’s coercion analysis as well: 
Scholars have argued that the states often do not have a realistic choice 
other than to accept the federal government’s condition upon the receipt 
of funds. This lack of real choice occurs because the federal government 
has become richer in relation to the states; the federal tax burden has 
steadily increased over the last several decades. This heightened federal 
burden makes it more difficult for the states to raise local taxes because 
their constituents have less after-federal-tax income then [sic] in the past. 
Therefore, the increased federal income tax in relation to the states has 
resulted in the states being put in a position of greater dependence on 
federal funds.412 
Although we know that the joint dissenters lost in the battle of the co-
ercion tests, even if they had won, Megan’s Law would probably still not be 
significant enough to amount to coercion. The joint dissent’s hypothetical 
dealt with education funding.413 While federal education funding for the 
states amounts to far less than federal Medicaid funding, it is still signifi-
cantly more than the JAG grant. In the fiscal year of 2011 alone, the gov-
ernment allocated over $35 billion to the states for elementary and second-
ary education programs.414 This amount of money makes the JAG grant’s 
less than half a billion dollars over the course of three years look like 
chump-change. This is not to diminish the importance that the states or the 
federal government place on our law enforcement in this country, but is 
merely to exhibit that the difference in amount of federal funds is important 
in determining whether a state is being coerced into doing the federal gov-
ernments bidding; and, even based on the joint dissent’s analysis, it appears 
Megan’s Law would survive. Despite all of this, it is still necessary to do a 
full coercion analysis using the plurality’s coercion test. Thus, Megan’s Law 
must be analyzed under the test’s independence element.  
2. Independence 
In Mr. Koenig’s 1998 article, he concluded that one of the reasons Me-
gan’s Law was constitutional was because it met the “germaneness” or “re-
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latedness” test in Dole.415 Again, while the germaneness test is different 
from the independence element of coercion, it is still necessary to mention 
because it is required for Congress to have authority to enact its spending 
condition416 and can easily become confused with coercion’s independence 
element. After a lengthy germaneness analysis, Mr. Koenig finally conclud-
ed that Megan’s Law was germane to the purpose of law enforcement fund-
ing because the goal of releasing a sex offender’s information was to deter 
crime, which is a traditional function of law enforcement.417  
It is somewhat unclear whether the condition in Megan’s Law is inde-
pendent from the JAG grant. One the one hand, when contrasted with Dole, 
the condition does not seem like an independent condition. In Dole, the 
drinking age condition was independent because it “was not a restriction on 
how the highway funds—set aside for specific highway improvement and 
maintenance efforts—were to be used.”418 However, “[t]he condition Con-
gress imposed on the states with the passage of Megan’s Law specifies how 
some of the federal money is to be spent by local law enforcement agen-
cies—to release information pertaining to sex offenders necessary to protect 
the public.”419 Moreover, there are significant structural differences between 
the Medicaid expansion and Megan’s Law. The Medicaid expansion provid-
ed for the new recipients to be covered with completely different funds than 
the original Medicaid recipients.420 Megan’s Law, however, uses the original 
threatened federal funding to expand state law enforcement programs.421 In 
addition, many states’ law enforcement agencies prior to Megan’s Law “fre-
quently compile[d] and retain[ed] information pertaining to convicted of-
fenders,”422 many of which were sex offenders.423 “Additionally, police 
[would] often make [this] information available to the public when doing so 
would aid in the apprehension of a suspect.”424 This is in contrast to the 
Medicaid expansion, which had never before covered all individuals under 
the age of 65 with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty line.425 Thus, 
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there is a strong argument that Megan’s Law is not an independent program 
but is simply a continuation of something law enforcement has always done. 
On the other hand, because releasing relevant information about sex of-
fenders is only one aspect of law enforcement, Megan’s Law could also be 
seen as independent. The plurality opinion was somewhat unclear where to 
draw the line—even the Medicaid expansion was a toss-up.426 At first 
glance, the Medicaid expansion seemed like it was simply another change to 
a federal program—something Congress has always done. Before the ex-
pansion, Medicaid covered four particular groups.427 After the expansion, 
however, Medicaid was required to cover those four groups plus an addi-
tional other large group.428 Although Congress claimed that all of these 
groups were part of one health care program, the plurality did not agree.429 
To the plurality, there were now two different health care programs—one 
old Medicaid program and one new Medicaid program.430 The old Medicaid 
program would cover the original four groups, and the new Medicaid pro-
gram would cover this new expansive group of uninsured individuals.431 
There is an argument that Megan’s Law accomplishes the same outcome. 
There are other aspects of law enforcement other than providing sex offend-
er information to the public; however, this particular condition under Me-
gan’s Law covers only that aspect.432 Thus there are now two different law 
enforcement programs—the original all-encompassing law enforcement 
program and a new law enforcement program designed to deal solely with 
sex offender information. Therefore, one could argue that, like the Medicaid 
expansion, Congress is using the funding for states’ current law enforcement 
programs as leverage to force them to accept this new and independent law 
enforcement program known as Megan’s Law.  
3. Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis, it is highly probable that Mr. Koenig’s 
conclusion back in 1998 would still be correct today: Megan’s Law is not an 
unconstitutional use of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. The threatened JAG grant amounts to such a small 
amount of money and Congress is only threatening to revoke a mere ten 
percent of it. These two factors make it next-to-impossible for the condition 
  
 426. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 427. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.).  
 428. Id. at 2606. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id.  
 431. Id. at  2605–06. 
 432. 42 U.S.C. § 16921(b) (2006).  
662 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35  
to meet the significance element of coercion. If Professor Bagenstos is cor-
rect and “[c]oercion is present only when the new condition ties continued 
participation in an entrenched and lucrative funding program to a state’s 
agreement also to participate in a separate and independent program,”433 it is 
unnecessary to even move to the next element of the coercion test. Thus, 
although it is unclear whether Megan’s Law satisfies the independence ele-
ment, it is irrelevant because the threatened JAG grant does not rise to a 
requisite level of significance under the NFIB v. Sebelius standard.  
Furthermore, even under an interpretation using unconscionability 
principles, Megan’s Law would still likely be constitutional. Regardless of 
the independence element’s outcome, it is likely that no court would find 
enough significance to balance out a sliding scale of coercion. Therefore, 
although Megan’s Law might have, at first glance, prompted an initial coer-
cion analysis, even after NFIB v. Sebelius, it is highly unlikely that any state 
would have a chance at proving its case of coercion to the courts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite all of the initial fear that arose after the Supreme Court’s 
spending clause ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius, a powerful argument can be 
made that the Court did not disrupt the status quo. Congress’s ability to 
place conditions on the federal grants it distributes remains largely intact. 
This case, however, still remains incredibly important. Before this case, a 
state’s argument that a federal condition was coercive was doomed in any 
court. Although the pendulum has not swung in the complete opposite direc-
tion since NFIB v. Sebelius, the states should at least now be able to get their 
coercion argument in the door of the lower court system. While it may still 
be too soon to tell the outcome of future state litigation based on the NFIB v. 
Sebelius decision, one thing is for certain with the lower courts: the signifi-
cance and independence elements will play a huge role in their decision-
making process of whether a federal condition is coercive.  
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